Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1955

Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Company and Alvin T.
Locke v. Harsh Utah Corporation et al : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
John M. Sherman; Young, Thatcher & Glasmann; Attorneys for Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Co. v. Locke, No. 8336 (Utah Supreme Court, 1955).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2351

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

.· ·\~
.. _:".. ~;.
..

,,· ,.

'

•'"f.;;:·P!'t;....··....- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - .
..

·~··-------------------·

···--------------------t

,1.,

,r,

~-·'~ ~---------------------·
No. 8336

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE

OF.:uT~
.
,.
~--.;

_ _____,.-..=;.,t·-

ithin Bri~l ·,· ··
I

L~r~

..

PACIFIC STATES CAST IRON P~~E _, .~.-.-~->':~~:\
COMPANY, et al.
.... .::~:-~(- __,,.~..:!' :,·Plaintiffs,

.

and

'l~i1.

ALVIN T. LOCKE,
Intervening Plaintiff and
Respondent,

vs.
HARSH UTAH CORPORATION, a corporation, HARSH INVESTMENT CORPORATION, a corporation, and HAROLD
J. SCHNITZER, an individual.
Defendants and Appellants.

Respondents Brief
JOHN M. SHERMAN
212 California Bank Bldg.
Pasadena, California
YOUNG, THATCHER, & GLASMANN
1018 First Security Bank Bldg.
Ogden, Utah
'Attorneys for Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PRELIMINARY STATE1~lENT ----------------------------------

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS: -------------------------------------------- 4
In re Background and Preliminary Agreements
Between the Parties ------------------------------------------------------ 4
In re Requirements Pertaining to Wherry
Housing Projects ------------------------------------------------------------ 6
In re Final Agreements Between the Parties ______________ 10
In re Activities of the Parties Pursuant to the
Agreement of October 4th, 1951 -------------------------------- 13
In re Schnitzer's Failure to Finance the Project __________ 17
In re Trial Court's Decision ------------------------------------------ 21
In re Further Proceedings in the Trial Court
Before and After Formal Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law ------------------------------------------------ 25
In re Wiring of Schnitzer's Hotel Room ---------------------- 27
STATEMENT OF POINTS ON APPEAL ____________ 30-31
ARGUMENT ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 32
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY
CONSTRUED THE AGREEMENT OF
OCTOBER 4th, 1951 -·-------------------------------------------------- 32
A. The Preponderance of the Evidence
Shows a Distinction between Project
Costs and Construction Costs ---------------------------- 36
B. Th'e Conduct of the Parties Before Litigation Shows a Distinction between Construction Costs and Project Costs -------------------- 44
C. The Pleadings of Locke are Proper ---------------- 47
Conclusion -----------------------------·------·-----------------------·---·----------- 49
Conclusion ----·-------------------·----------------------------·-------------- 49
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page

POINT II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES SUPPORT
THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE
TRIAL COURT ------------------------------------------------------------ 50
POINT III. A PROPER AND ACCURATE
ACCOUNTING SHOWS LOCKE ENTITLED TO A BONUS -------------------------------------------- 53
A. The Findings of Fact of the Trial Court
in re the Total Receipts are Conclusively
Supported by the Evidence -------------------------------- 53
Conclusion -------------------------------------------------------------------- 66
B. The Findings of Fact of the Trial Court
in re Expenditures are Conclusively
Supported by the Evidence -------------------------------- 67
Conclusion -------------------------------------------------------------------POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY
CONSTRUED F.H.A. RULES AND REGU. -LATIONS ---------------------------------------------------------------------POINT V. THE FINDINGS OF FACT SUBSTANTIATE ADDITIONAL FUNDS DUE
LOCKE1 PERTAINING TO THE CALIFORNIA PROJECT ---------------------------------------------------POINT VI. SET-OFFS DUE BY RESPONDENT LOCKE TO APPELLANTS SCHNITZER AND HARSH INVESTMENT CORPORATION WERE PROPERLY DETERMINED ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

73

74

77

77

CONCLUSION ------------------------------------------------------------------ 78
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON CROSS APPE·AL -----------------···-····--··--·------------------····-------------------------- 80
STATEMENT OF FACTS ON CROSS APPEAL ---------------------------··-···--------·-------------------------------···---· 80

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PRELIMINARY STATE,~IENT ----------------------------------

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS: -------------------------------------------In re Background and Preliminary Agreements
Between the Parties ------------------------------------------------------

4
4

In re Requirements Pertaining to Wherry
Housing Projects ------------------------------------------------------------ 6
In re Final Agreements Between the Parties ______________ 10
In re Activities of the Parties Pursuant to the
Agreement of October 4th, 1951 -------------------------------- 13
In re Schnitzer's Failure to Finance the Project __________ 17
In re Trial Court's Decision ------------------------------------------ 21
In re Further Proceedings in the Trial Court
Before and After Formal Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law ------------------------------------------------ 25
In re Wiring of Schnitzer's Hotel Room ---------------------- 27
STATEMENT OF POINTS ON APPEAL ____________ 30-31
ARGUMENT ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 32
POINT L THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY
CONSTRUED THE AGREEMENT OF
OCTOBER 4th, 1951 ---------------------------------------------------- 32
A. The Preponderance of the Evidence
Shows a Distinction between Project
Costs and Construction Costs ---------------------------- 36
B. The Conduct of the Parties Before Litigation Shows a Distinction between Construction Costs and Project Costs -------------------- 44
C. The Pleadings of Locke are Proper ---------------- 47
Conclusion ---------------···-···--·-···-·············-·-------------------·-··-------- 49
Conclusion ---··-········--·-----··········--··-------------------------------- 49
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page

POINT II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES SUPPORT
THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE
TRIAL COURT ------------------------------------------------------------ 50
POINT III. A PROPER AND ACCURATE
ACCOUNTING SHOWS LOCKE ENTITLED TO A BONUS -------------------------------------------- 53
A. The Findings of Fact of the Trial Court
in re the Total Receipts are Conclusively
Supported by the Evidenc'e -------------------------------- 53

Conclusion -------------------------------------------------------------------- 66
B. The Findings of Fact of the Trial Court
in re Expenditures are Conclusively
Supported by the Evidence -------------------------------- 67
Conclusion -------------------------------------------------------------------POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY
CONSTRUED F.H.A. RULES AND REGU-LATIONS ---------------------------------------------------------------------POINT V. THE FINDINGS OF FACT SUBSTANTIATE ADDITIONAL FUNDS DUE
LOCKE1 PERTAINING TO THE CALIFORNIA PROJECT ---------------------------------------------------POINT VI. SET-OFFS DUE BY RESPONDENT LOCKE TO APPELLANTS SCHNITZER AND HARSH INVESTMENT CORPORATION WERE PROPERLY DETERMINED ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

73

74

77

77

CONCLUSION ------------------------------------------------------------------ 78
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON CROSS APPEAL -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 80
STATEl\1:ENT OF FACTS ON CROSS APPEAL -----------------------·--·-····------------------------------------------------ 80
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
STATEMENT OF POINTS ON CROSS APPEAL -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 83
ARGUMENT: -------------------------------------------------------------------- 83
POINT I. THE AMOUNT OF THE CHANGE
ORDER EXTRAS SHOULD HAVE BEEN
IN THE SUM OF $333,952.55 INSTEAD OF
$178,672.00. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 83
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD
NOT HAVE ALLOWED APPELLANTS
TO RECEIVE 10% OF THE AMOUNT OF
THE BID. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 87
CONCLUSION

------------------------------------------------------------------109

AUTHORITIES CITED
STATUTES:
Sections 16-2-15 and 76-13-4, subsections (1)
and (2) U.C.A. 1953 -------------------------------------------------------- 93
COURT DECISIONS:
Baugh v. Darby, 112 U. 1, 184 P 2d 335 -----------·------------107
Elliott v. Whitmore, 23 Utah 462, 65 Pac. 70 ____________ 100
Geary v. Cain, 79 Utah 268, 9 Pac. 2d 396 -------------------- 66
Hansen v. :Mutual Financ'e Corporation, 84 Utah
579, 37 p 2d 782 --------------------------------------------------------------100
Hummel v. Hummel, 14 N.E. 2d 923 ------------------------------107
Lawlor v. Lawlor, ____________ Utah ____________ , 240 P 2d
271 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------101
McKay v. Farr, 15 Utah 261, 49 Pac. 649 ____________________ 100
Pace v. Pace Bros. Co., 91 Utah 149, 63 P 2d 590 ________ 93
Salina Canyon Coal Co. v. Klemm 76 Utah 372,
290 Pac. 161 (Syllabus No. 24) ------------------------------------ 66
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page

Shaw v. Jeppson, __________ Utah __________ , 239 P 2d745 __________ 101
Sidney Stevens Implement Company v. South
Ogden Land Building and Improvement Company, 20 Utah 267, 58 Pac. 843 ----------------------------------100
Western Securitres Co. v. Spiro, 62 Utah 623,
221 Pac. 856 -------------------------------------------------------------------- 66
Wilcox v. Cloward, 88 Utah 503, 56 2d 1 ______________________ 100
ENCYCLOPEniAS, TEXTS, ETC.:
17 CJS "Contracts", Section 130, Note 49 ________________ 105
17 CJS "Contracts", Sections 331 to 334, and
cases cited ------------------------------------------------------------------------105
Restatement of the Law: Restitution, Section 1 __________ 106
Restatement of the Law: R'estitution Section 1
comment e ------------------------------------------------------------------------106
Appendix
APPENniX, following ----------------------------------------------------109
Testimony of Milton n. Goldberg re Books and
Records ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
Testimony of Walter E. Hutchinson re Project
Costs and Construction Costs -------------------------------------- 4
Testimony of William Ellis re Funds and Mortgage ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8
Testimony of W. Harold Warwick re Escrow
Funds -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11
Testimony of Walter E. Hutchinson re Construction Contract-"Lump Sum" and Change
Orders ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 16
Testimony of W. Harold Warwick re Construction Contract-"Lump Sum" ---------------------------------------- 22

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
Testimony
Orders
Testimony
Orders
Testimony
Orders
Testimony

of Walter E. Hutchinson re Change
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------of W. Harold Warwick re Change
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------of Arthur W. Isakson re Change
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------of _Mr. Isakson, re Change OrOder 77 ________

23
27
29
31

Testimony of William Ellis re Withdrawal of
Funds -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 33
Testimony of Harold J. Schnitzer re payment
of Construction Contract-"Lump Sum" and
Available Funds -------------------------------------------------------------- 34
Testimony of William Ellis re Withdrawal of
Funds and Payment of Construction Contract
-"Lump Sum" ---------------------------------------------------------------- 38
Testimony of Locke re Construction Costs and
Project Costs and Profits -------------------------------------------- 40
Testimony of Milton D. Goldberg re Mortgage
Proceeds -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 42
Testimony of Milton D. Goldberg in re the Card
Greaves Report-E.x. 182 -------------------------------------------- 43

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
PACIFIC STATES CAST IRON PIPE
COMPANY, et al.
Plaintiffs,
and
ALVIN T. LOCKE,
Intervening Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.
HARSH UTAH CORPORATION, a corporation, HARSH INVESTMENT CORPORATION, a corporation, and HAROLD
J. SCHNITZER, an individual.
Defendants and Appellants.

Respondents Brief
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In this action the plaintiff Locke sought to foreclose
a mechanic's lien for monies due him as construction
superintendent on a Wherry Housing Project located at
Hill Field Air Force Base. He sought to recover a bonus
due under a contract between the parties for the bidding
and construction of said Wherry Housing Project. The
contract provided that the defendant Schnitzer, for financing the project, should first receive, out of the profits of the construction of the project, an amount equal
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to 10% of the parties' bid for the project, and that of
the remaining profits, the plaintiff should have 50% as
a bonus for his services. Locke sought one-half of all
tlre profits and to eliminate Schnitzer's preference of
10% upon the grounds that Schnitzer had failed in his
obligation to finance the project. The Court granted
plaintiff judgment for one-half of the profits, after
deducting Schnitzer's 10% and Schnitzer and the other
defendants appeal'ed. Locke cross appeals, contending
that the Court should have eliminated Schnitzer's preferred 10% and also contending that the court should
have allowed a larger profit arising out of additional
work and services performed under the construction
contract pursuant to "change orders" executed between
Harsh Utah Corporation as the owner corporation and
Harsh Investment Corporation as the contracting corporation.
Inasmuch as respondent-intervening plaintiff, Alvin
T. Locke, controverts the appellants' statement of facts
in certain particulars, he feels obligated to set forth
below specific reasons requiring him to refute the statement of facts of appellants.
Appellants, in their statement of facts, from Page
2 through Page 41 of their brief, make many broad and
sweeping statements completely unsupported by, and contrary to, the evidence and record.
Appellants engage in speculation and theory
throughout their entire brief with absolutely no reference to the records in many respects, as required by
rule. It is submitted that appellants cannot support
their theory by the actual r'ecord.
2
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During the trial of the action, appellants' apparent
defense to the claims of respondent was a campaign
to discredit th'e character and reputation of respondent, and inasmuch as this attack completely failed, appellants now, before this Court, make an attempt at a
new defense, based upon theory, and completely unsupported by the evidence and r'ecord.
Respondent, in his reply brief, will not attempt to
answer appellants' arguments based upon matters not
within, and completely foreign to, the record of the trial
Court below, such as the Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
report which is not a part of the trial record in any way
whatsoever. Respondent will, consistently and unequivocally, in this brief make only such statements of fact
and present only such argument as can and will be supported by the record, with complete and accurate reference to the record in each instance.
During the course of this trial two different reporters
were used. The transcript, therefore, is as follows: That
portion of the trial reported by Cecil E. Tucker is in
Volume I (R. 283), Pages 1 through 599 and Volume II
(R. 284), Pages 600 through 1165 and will be referred
to as (T.(page number) throughout respondent's brief.
The remaining record, being the transcript reported by
J. L. :May (R. 285 ), Pages 1 through 250, will be referred to throughout respondents brief as (T. page number-M), indicating in each instance May's transcript, No.
285 of the Record.
Respondent further observes and directs this Court's
attention to the fact that apparently in transmitting the
official record to this Court, the Court below forwarded
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all 'exhibits pertaining to trials by various plaintiffs
against the appellants and that many of them were not
referred to or used in the trial between respondent and
appellants.
Respondent has further observed that the official
record of the proceedings, when received by respondent,
was marked with pencil marks in a good many instances
and various pages thereof had b'een folded and marked
with paper clips. Respondent desires to point out that
respondent's attorneys have, in no way, marked or
placed any paper clips or other foreign substances upon
the official record of tlle Court below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
IN RE BACKGROU.ND AND PRELIMINARY
AGREEMENTS BETWEEiN THE PARTIES
Respondent Locke met appellant Schnitzer on June
21st, 1951, at Portland, Oregon, (T. 26-M; 854-855), not
"shortly before June of 1951", as asserted by appellants
on Page 3 of their brief. Previous to this meeting Locke
had been engaged in the construction business as a
general construction superintendent on large housing
projects. Schnitzer had recently sold an interest in a
family business and was looking for an opportunity to
invest his capital.
The parties, Locke and Schnitzer, entered into their
first agreement, Ex. 156, on the day of their first me·eting, June 21st, 1951 (T. 26-M; 854-855). This agreement
is set forth on Page 1 of the appendix to appellants'
brief. By the terms of this agreem'ent, Locke was to
furnish to Schnitzer certain technical information regarding the bidding and the acquisition of a Wherry
4
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Housing Project at Deseret Chemical Depot in Utah.
For this assistance Schnitzer was to pay Locke $50,000.00
out of profits. The parties were not successful bidders
on this project and no monies were paid to Locke under
this agreement.
Between June 21st, 1951 and July 24th, 1951, both
Locke and Schnitzer made further investigation pertaining to the Wherry Housing Project at Deseret
Chemical Depot in Utah. In Salt Lake City on July
24th, 1951, Schnitzer and Locke 'entered into their second
agreement, Ex. 157, which is set forth on Page 3 of the
appendix to appellants' brief. This agreement was a
joint venture pertaining to the construction and ownership of the Wh'erry Housing Project at the Deseret
Chemical Depot. By the terms of this agreement,
Schnitzer was guaranteed a return of $150,000.00 from
profits and all remaining profits were to be divided
equally betwe'en the parties. The $150,000.00 was 10%
of the amount of the proposed bid of $1,500,000.00 on this
project. (T. 861
) The parties were not the successful bidders on this project.
Between July 24th, 1951 and August 29th, 1951,
Locke and Schnitzer procured plans and specifications
for three additional Wherry Housing Projects located
at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Arizona, Hill Field
Air Force Base in Utah and Great Falls Air Force Base
at Great Falls, Montana. They subsequently submitted
bids on all three projects, pursuant to an "Invitation for
Proposal", Ex. 228. This exhibit pertained to Hill Field
Air Force Base Housing Project and similar invitations
were issued pertaining to the Great Falls, Montana, Air

5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Force Base Housing Project and Davis-Monthan Air
Force Bas'e Housing Project.
On August 29th, 1951, Schnitzer and Locke at
Portland, Oregon, entered into their third agreement,
Ex. 158, set forth on Page 5 of the appendix to appellants' brief. This agreement p'ertained to the bidding
of the above mentioned three projects and provided that
Schnitzer was to furnish the necessary capital and Locke
was to provide his services to sup'ervise the construction
of said projects. This agreement further provided for
a guaranteed return to Schnitzer of a sum equal to 10%
of the total monies received from the Government for
such construction. It further provided for a division
of profits equally beween Locke and Schnitzer. This
agreement, like the second agr·eement, was a joint venture agreement between Locke and Schnitzer to construct and to own the leasehold improvements on th'e
Wherry Housing Projects therein mentioned. Essentially, Schnitzer's obligation was to provide the necessary capital and Locke's obligation was to supply the
construction knowledge and ability in the capacity of
construction sup'erintendent to supervise the building of
said projects.
IN RE REQUIREMENTS PERTAINING TO
WHERRY HOUSING PROJECTS.
It is important at this point to examine the record
to determine what knowledge the parties had pertaining
to a Wherry Housing Project and the obligations of the
parties interested in said Wherry Housing Projects as
well as the benefits acquired incident to the ownership
and construction of said projects. The Invitation for
6
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Proposal, Ex. 228, under date of August 2nd, 1951, and
the Administrative Rules and Regulations for Military
Housing Insurance under Title VIII of the National
Housing Act, Ex. 3, clearly set forth the program. These
documents themselves clearly refute appellant's contention that th'e only funds available for the construction
of the Wherry Housing Project were the proceeds of
the mortgage, and further clearly refute appellants' contention pertaining to the financial obligations of Schnitzer and Harsh Utah Corporation as th'e owner-managing
corporation. For sake of clarity, the following is a summarization of the various provisions of the Wherry
Housing program.
1. A Wherry Housing Project is provided for by
a program under the Wherry Act whereby military
housing units are built on Government-owned military
bases by private corporations. The F. H. A. rules and
regulations, Ex. 3, provide the control for the financing
and construction pertaining to the projects.
(a) Pursuant to the Invitation for Proposal, Ex.
228, bids are submitted by a sponsor to own a leasehold
interest granted by the Government and to build th'ereon
the housing facilities contemplated. The Lease, Ex. 251
provides for a land rental annually of $100.00 per year
for 75 years.
(b) A successful, qualified sponsor, submitting th'e
low bid, must then enter into certain negotiations, preparatory to construction. The Invitation for Proposal,
Ex. 228, among other things, provides, Paragraph 6.
thereof, as follows:
"Sponsors are advised that the approved rental
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schedule will be based upon a 'net return', not exceeding 6lj2 % of the sponsor's estimated replacement cost or the F. H. A. estimate of r'eplacement,
whichever is the lower . . . . . "
The Invitation for Proposal further provides, Paragraph 7 thereof, as follows:
"Sponsors are advised that the rnaximum approved amount of insurable mortgage ,,·ill in no
event exceed 90% of the sponsor's total ·estimated
replacement cost stipulated in said proposal."
This terminology in the above mentioned exhibit made
it clear to both Locke and Schnitzer at an ·early date
that additional funds over and above the mortgage would
be required. This is unquestionably the reason for the
provision in the agreement betwe'en the parties providing for a 10% return of the amount of the bid to Schnitzer. Before any division of profit, Schnitzer was required to furnish all additional funds required over the
mortgage proceeds to assure successful completion of
the projects and to establish the equity of ownership.
(c) The initial Invitation for Proposal above referred to also clearly s'ets forth other require1nents pertaining to mortgage financing. Tlle Application for
Mortgage Insurance, Ex. 187, and the Land Lease, Ex.
251, in addition thereto set forth the maximum allowable insurance mortgage in the amount of $2,904,000.00
and the F. H. A. total replacement cost of $3,226,737.00.
(d) At the time th'e bid was submitted the sponsor
was required to submit an Application for Mortgage
Insurance, Ex. 187. The application clearly provided
that the sponsor must submit financial schedules showS
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ing the sources of the equity that the sponsor would be
requir'ed to have in said projects (the above mentioned
10% ). Ex. 187 shows that this equity would be furnished
by advances from Schnitzer totalling $500,000.00. The
document was signed by Harold J. Schnitzer on August
28th, 1951.
2. Under the Wherry Housing Act, a successful
bidder must complete the requirements of the Commissioner of F. H. A. under the rules and regulations, Ex.
3, and, among other things, complete the following:
(a) Form an F. H. A. owning corporation to act in
the capacity of lessee under the Lease, Mortgagor under
the Mortgage and owner under the Construction Contract - "Lump Sum".
(b) The owning corporation must then enter into
a construction contract for th~ construction of the project. The construction company must complete the project within a period of 24 months; Ex. 61.
(c) Upon completion of the project and acceptance
by the F. H. A., the Mortgage, Ex. 63, is then transferred
from a private lending institution, Irving Trust Company, to the F'ederal National Mortgage Insurance Association. The owning corporation is then in active
management and control of the project, collecting all of
the rental proceeds from said project and has a period
of 33 lj3 years to retire the existing mortgage on its
property. The rules and regulations of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, provide that the owning corporation
is allowed to totally depreciate the project for income
tax purposes over the same period of the loan, that is,
9
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over331/3 years, and this depreciation schedule results,
insofar as income taxes are concern'ed, in tax-free income to said owning corporation. The evidence will
disclose that, insofar as the Hill Field Air Force Base
is concerned, the minimum tax-free income r'eceived by
the owning corporation is in excess of $30,000.00 per
year (T. 1135) and a greater amount pertaining to the
Great Falls, Montana, Air Force Base Housing Project
and the Barstow, California, Marin'e Corps Housing
Project, for a total annual income to the corporations
controlled by appellant Schnitzer of approximately
$100,000.00 per year (T. 1007-1010, 1134-1136).
IN RE FINAL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN
THE PARTIES
Subsequent to August 29th, 1951, Schnitzer and
Locke submitted bids for the above mentioned thre'e
Wherry Housing Projects, to-wit: Hill Field Air Force
Base Housing Project, Great Falls Air Force Base
Housing Project and Davis-Monthan Air Force Base
Housing Project. However, due to the widespread locations of the projects, they only accepted two of the contracts, to-wit, those pertaining to Hill Field Air Force
Base Housing Project and Great Falls, Montana, Air
Force Base Housing Project.
Between August 29th, 1951, and Octob'er 4th, 1951,
Schnitzer and Locke entered into another written agreement and during the course of the trial, respondent demanded that app'ellants produce this agreement. They
did not do so. (T. 981, 31M, 177M) The testimony pertaining to the terms and conditions of this agreement is
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to the effect that Locke's ownership interest was reduced
from 50% to 10%. (T. 31M-32M, 41M, 177M). The final
agre·ement entered into between the parties, which is the
subject matter of the litigation herein, was executed on
October 4th, 1951, Eoc. 162, and is set forth beginning
on Page 7 of the appendix to appellants' brief. By the
terms and conditions of this agre'ement, any ownership
interest theretofore held by Locke in the above mentioned projects was eliminated. This was caused by
representations made to Locke by Schnitzer to the effect
that inasmuch as they were undertaking more than one
Wherry Housing Project that it would be necessary for
Schnitzer to dispose of stock interest in the ownership
corporations in order to complete his part of the agreement to provide the necessary financing of said projects. (T. 32M-33M, 41M, 77-79) Because of these
representations, Locke was induced to give up his ownership interest theretofor'e held under the terms and conditions of the previous agreements, Exs. 157, and 158.
However, after Schnitzer successfully prevailed upon
Locke to part with his ownership interest, lle did not, at
any time, dispose of any of the stock of the ownership
corporations and did not perform the obligations required of him to provide necessary financing for said
projects, as will be set forth in greater detail subsequently in this brief.
The agreement of October 4th, 1951, Ex. 162, also
included as a party the Harsh Investment Corporation.
This was a corporation owned by Schnitzer prior to his
becoming acquainted with Locke and the record will
show, contrary to the contentions of appellants on Page
3 of their brief, who claimed that this corporation was
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not then in existance, that this corporation was, in fact,
incorporated by Harold J. Schnitzer in the State of
Oregon on March 30th, 1950 (T. 1), Ex. 160. The bids
her'etofore referred to had been submitted by Locke and
Schnitzer before October 4th, indicating that the sponsor
would be Harsh Investment Corporation and the builder
the Schnitzer Construction Co. (T. 80-81, 786) However, the Schnitzer Construction Co. was never used by
the parties. The agreement of October 4th, 1951, provided for a salary to Locke in the amount of $1,000.00
per month and in addition thereto provided "from the
net profits earned by Harsh in connection with the construction of the aforesaid projects there shall first be
retain'ed by Harsh a sum of money equal to 10% of the
total amount of the bids made by Harsh and accepted
by the Government on the aforesaid projects and from
the remaining net profits earned by Harsh as aforesaid
there shall be paid to Locke 50% thereof by way of
bonus." The agreement further provided that in the
event the projects were built by any company other than
a company in which Schnitzer had an interest that Locke
was to receive as a bonus a minimum of $15,000.00 per
project and a maximum of $25,000.00 per project. However, although negotiations were carried on with the Vitt
Construction Co. and the Utah Construction Co. to act
as the builder and contractor for the entire projects
(T. 785 Ex. 227), these negotiations were never completed and subsequently Schnitzer caused the Harsh Construction Co. to be incorporated to act as the construction corporation in Montana and California (T. 119, 120)
and designated the Harsh Investment Corporation to be
the contractor of the Hill Field Air Force Base Housing

12
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Project (T. 119,120).
IN RE ACTIVITIES OF THE PARTIES PURSUANT
TO THE AGREEMENT OF OCTOBER 4th, 1951.
Subsequent to October 4th, 1951, and pursuant to
the rules and regulations for Wherry Housing, the Certification of Need for Military Housing was issued by
the Secretary of the Air Force on November 14th, 1951,
Ex. 227. This document designated Harsh Investment
Corporation as sponsor and the builder as Herbert Vitt.
However, subsequently an amended Certification of
Need for Military Housing was issued and the sponsor
was changed to Harsh Utah Corporation, and the builder
was designated as Harsh Investment Corporation. Under
the direction of the Secretary of the Air Force and the
F. H. A., certain requirements had to be met and negotiations in this regard were carried on by both Locke
and Schnitzer in the intervening period between October
4th, 1951 and July 21st, 1952, which was the date referred to as the final closing of all of the requirements
under the Administrative Rules and Regulations hereinabove referred to. Both Schnitzer and Locke, on behalf of Harsh Utah Corporation, began negotiations with
a private !'ending institution, the Irving Trust Co., to
obtain a construction loan pursuant to the Application
for Mortgage Insurance, Ex. 187, hereinabove referred
to. On 1'Iay 29th, 1952, the F. H. A. issued its Commitment for Mortgage Insurance, Ex. 186, to the Harsh
Utah Corporation as sponsor and mortgagor and to the
Irving Trust Co. as mortgagee, s·etting forth therein the
terms and conditions of the F.H.A. Mortgage Insurance,
Ex. 186. By the terms and conditions of said exhibit,
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it is provided as follows in Section (h) (2) thereof, Page

2:
"Funds, (if any) required over and above mortgage proceeds for completion of the project ....
$727,742.00 . . . The said fund 1nay be reduced
by so much of said Builder's and Architect'1' fPP~,
up to a maximum of $146,522.00, as the closing
documents show are not to be paid for in cash".
In this instance, this amount was the contractor's fee
which was waived by Harsh Investment Corporation
thereby reducing the amount of funds required to be
placed in Harsh Utah Corporation by Schnitz·er (T. 336;
1155).
On July 9th, 1952, the F. H. A. issued its Financial
Requirements for Closing pertaining to the Hill Field
Air Force Base Housing Project, Ex. 188. By the terms
and conditions of this document, and in particular Item
20 thereof, it shows "cash to be deposited in an escrow
by mortgagor to complete above requirements, $585,442.00." This amount is in addition to Item 27 on said
exhibit, "Total cash allocated to construction, $2,995,205.00". This document was issued by F.H.A. pursuant
to the rules and regulations, Ex. 3, and preliminary to
th'e execution of the Building and Loan Agreement, Ex.
64, and the Mortgage, Ex. 63, which were executed on
the 21st day of July, 1952, also in accordance with the
rules and regulations, Ex. 3.
By the terms and conditions of the Building and
Loan Agreement, Ex. 64, and in particular Paragraph
5 thereof, Page 2, it is provided as follows :
"The Borrower agrees that any sum or sums re14
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quired for the construction of th'e project over
and above the proceeds of the loan and deposited
with the Lender for that purpose shall be advanced by the Lender to the Borrower prior to
the advance of any proceeds of the loan; and the
Borrower covenants that it will receive all advances hereunder as a tntst fund to be applied
first for the purpose of paying for the cost of
improvements before using any part of the total
of the same for any other purpose, but nothing
herein shall impose upon the Lender any obligation to see to the proper application of such advances by the Borrower." (Italics supplied.)
The above referred to exhibits, the Financial Requirements for Closing, Ex. 188, and the Building and Loan
Agreement, Eoc. 64, clearly set forth that the cash requirements over and above the proceeds of the mortgage
that must be furnished by Schnitzer under the terms and
conditions of the agreement of October 4th, 1951, with
Locke are in the total amount of $651,690.00. This documentary evidence clearly refutes appellants' contention
throughout their brief that the only proceeds intended
to be available for the construction of the Hill Field Air
Force Base Housing Project were the proceeds of the
mortgage. This is further established by the rules and
regulations, Ex. 3, which, in Section V, Sub-paragraph 2.,
Page 7 provide as follows :
"The mortgagor must establish in a manner satisfactory to the Commissioner that, in addition to
the proce'eds of the insured mortgage, the mortgagor has funds sufficient to assure completion
of construction of the project.
The Commissioner may require such funds, if any, to be deposited with and held by the mortgagee in a
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special account or with an acceptable trustee or
escrow agent under an appropriate agreement approved by the Commissioner which will require
such funds to be expended for work and material
on th:e physical improvements prior to the advance of any mortgage money."
Also on July 21st, 1952, appellant Schnitzer, on behalf of Harsh Utah Corporation, as owner, and the
Harsh Investment Corporation, as contractor, 'executed
the Construction Contract-"Lump Sum", Ex. 61. By
the terms and conditions of this agreement Harsh Utah
Corporation as owner was to pay to Harsh Investment
Corporation as contractor the sum of $2,995,205.00 for
the construction of the Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Project.
By the terms of said Ex. 61, the Plans and Specifications, Ex. 1, are incorporated therein. The Plans and
Specifications provide how certain "change order extras" between the owner and the contractor are to b'e
obtained. This will be discussed in more detail subsequently in this brief. Appellants contend, on Pages
15, 16 and 17, of their brief, that the amount contained
in the Construction Contract-"Lump Sum" was dictated
by the rules and regulations of F. H. A. This is contrary to the evidence submitted by respondent and is
absolutely contrary to the testimony of appellants' own
witness, Walter E. Hutchinson, who stated under cross
examination that the F.H.A. did not dictate in any manner the amount of the Construction Contract-"Lump
Sum". This was further corroborated by the testimony
of W. Harold Warwick, Chief Mortgage Examiner for
F.H.A. The testimony pertaining to this fact is set
16
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forth on Pages 5-7; 22 of the app'endix to this brief.
Subsequent to October 4th, 1951, Locke fulfilled his
duties and obligations under the terms and conditions
of the agreement of October 4th, 1951, and in the capacity
of general construction superintendent successfully completed the construction of the Hill Field Air Force Base
Housing Project and the Great Falls, Montana, Air
Force Base Housing Project.
Pursuant to the terms and conditions of the agreement of October 4th, 1951, between the parties, Harold
J. Schnitzer did provide certain funds necessary under
the above referred to rules and regulations and other
documents for the financing of the Hill Field Air Force
Base Housing Project. However, in violation of the
provisions of the Building and Loan Agreement, Ex. 64,
the F.H.A. rules and regulations, Ex. 3 and in violation
of the agreement of October 4th, 1951, with Locke, these
funds were withdrawn within a short period of time.
Schnitzer's activities in this regard are set forth in the
next sub-division of this brief.
IN RE SCHNITZE<R'S FAILURE TO FINANCE
THE PROJECT
On July 21st, 1952, Schnitzer did cause to be deposited certain funds in escrow totalling $611,200.00 (T.
140; 143-146; 163-168) Under the terms and conditions
of the Committment for Mortgage Insurance and the
Building and Loan Agreement, thes'e funds were to remain on deposit as trust funds for the payment of subcontractors and materialmen and for payment of the
Construction Contract-"Lump Sum" hereinabove referred to. The testimony during the cours'e of trial of-
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fered by W. Harold Warwick of F.H.A. and substantiated by appellants' own witness, Walter E. Hutchinson,
was to the effect that the above mentioned mnount wm;
an escrow fund deposited with the Irving Trust Co. as
mortgagee and was paid out pursuant to requisitions of
funds to pay for certain project costs and installments
on the Construction Contract-"Lump Sum". (T. 829833, 1117-1121) See appendix Pages 11-15; 16-21. Contrary to the representations made by Schnitzer to Locke
that he would have to dispose of shares of stock in the
owning corporation to raise the necessary funds, Schnitzer did not hypothecate any of said stock to procure these
funds but borrowed a total of $200,000.00 from his
father-in-law, the sum of $300,000.00 from the First
National Bank of Portland and in violation of the trust
fund provision pertaining to the Montana Project,
transferred $97,000.00 from Harsh Construction Company in Montana, which was in violation of his agreement with Locke pertaining to the Montana project. In
addition to these funds, he did transfer $14,200.00 from
his own personal bank account to Harsh Utah Corporation. The above indicates the sources of funds used by
Schnitzer to create the 'escrow fund with Irving Trust
Co. hereinabove referred to.
Under the terms and conditions of the F.H.A. rules
and regulations, the Building and Loan Agreement, and
tire Application for Mortgage Insurance hereinabove set
forth, and his agreement with Locke, Schnitzer could not
legally use any of the above mentioned funds for his own
use and benefit. These funds were committed to establish his 10% 'equity in said project and to provide Harsh
Utah Corporation with sufficient funds with which to

18
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pay the obligations of Harsh Utah Corporation as will
be discussed in detail hereinafter in this brief, and to
pay to Harsh Investment Corporation the amount of the
"Construction Contract-Lump Sum" plus extras.
Under the above mentioned rules and r'egulations
and by the terms of the Commitment for Mortgage
Insurance and the Mortgage itself, as well as the Building and Loan Agreement, Irving Trust Co., as mortgagee, made advancements throughout the building of
the Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Project in accordance with certain requisitions submitted by the contractor during the course of construction. Attached to
each of said requisitions, which were initiated by Harsh
Investment Corporation as contractor, r'equesting funds
from Harsh Utah Corporation as owner-mortgagor, was
a certification for purposes of obtaining mortgage insurance from the F .H.A. on the mortgage proceeds advanced, that the funds advanced by the Irving Trust Co.
were for the purposes of paying for the expenses of
sub-contractors and materialmen as well as for the the
expenses of Harsh Investment Corporation as builder.
The documents executed in order to obtain these funds
are a part of the record and are Ex. 141. They certify
that all of the funds therein requested were disbursed
for the construction of the Hill Field Air Force Base
Housing Project.
In violation of the F.H.A. rules and regulations,
the Mortgage, the Commitment for Mortgage Insurance,
the Building and Loan Agreement and contrary to the
certification made to F.H.A. for insurance on mortgage
advances and th'e requisitions of funds from Irving
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Trust Co., Ex. 141, hereinabove referred to, and in violation of the agreement of October 4th, 1951 with Locke,
appellant Schnitzer wrongfully and illegally withdrew
funds between N ov'ember 5th, 1952 and March 24th, 1953,
from both Harsh Investment Corporation and Harsh
Utah Corporation in the total amount of $631,000.00
(T. 1094, 1095). These withdrawals are $19,800.00 in
excess of any funds provided by Schnitzer pertaining to
the Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Project. The
testimony during the course of the trial by W. Harold
Warwick, Pages 13 to 15 of the appendix; by William
Ellis; Pages 38 and 39 of the appendix; and by Walter
E. Hutchinson, Secretary of Harsh Utah Corporation,
Pages 16 to 21 of the appendix, was to the effect that
because of the withdrawal of thes'e funds it was impossible for Harsh Utah Corporation as owner to have sufficient funds to pay for the necessary expense of the
project and to pay to Harsh Investment Corporation the
amount of tlle Construction Contract- "Lump Sum".
Respondent submits that this is in direct violation of the
terms and conditions contemplated by the parties when
they executed their agreement of October 4th, 1951.
Schnitz'er was not entitled to withdraw any funds
until the completion of the project and it had been accepted by the Government, and a declaration of the
profits made between the parties. This would have
been, at the earliest, in July of 1954, or, to accept the
date argued by appellants in their brief, January of
1955, when th'e project was finally completed and accepted.
The unlawful manipulation of funds by Schnitzer
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hereinabove referred to, his illegal withdrawal of
$631,000.00 from Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh
Investment Corporation and the activities of Schnitzer
and Hutchinson in preparing false and fraudulent corporate resolutions during the course of the trial in the
Court below in an attempt to mislead the trial Court
and defraud Locke will be set forth in detail in respond'ent's brief on cross appeal.
IN RE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION
The trial Court properly distinguished between construction costs and project costs. Appellants, throughout their brief, attempt to show that Schnitzer, Harsh
Utah Corporation and Harsh Investment Corporation
are to be considered as a singl'e unit and attempt further
to show that the only proceeds available for the construction of Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Project
were the receipts of the mortgage. In accordanc'e with
the preponderance of the evidence, which was established
even by appellants' own witnesses, the trial court properly distinguished between exp'enses that were to be paid
by Harsh Utah Corporation as owner, including the
amount of the Construction Contract-"Lump Sum" and
the expenses to be paid by Harsh Investment Corporation as contractor. (See Appendix, Pages 4 to 7.)
The trial Court properly found that in computing
the bonus to which Locke would be entitled under the
terms and conditions of the contract of October 4th,
1951, that the income was as follows:
1. The amount of the Construction Contract
-"Lump Sum", $2,995,205.00.
2. The amount of the change order 'extras in
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the sum of $178,672.00. However, pertaining to
this figure, the Court selected the amount in accordance with the evidence by which the nwrtgage
would be increased rather than the sum of
$333,952.55 represtning the total an1ount pursuant
to the actual agreements betwe·en Harsh Utah
Corporation as owner and Harsh Investment Corporation as builder. This is the subject matter
of Point I of respondent's brief on cross appeal.
3. The net amount of the r'ental income received during the construction period of twentyfour months in the amount of $165,886.49.
The trial Court properly determined the amount of
the construction costs pertaining to the Hill Field Air
Force Base Housing Project as follows:
1. Direct construction costs, $2,656,457.21.

2. Indirect construction costs, to wit, general
overhead, $45,631.34. This amount was the actual
amount of overhead pertaining to Harsh Construction Co. in Montana which involved th'e construction of 400 units against 350 in Utah and the
expenditure of considerably more money. According to the testimony, Harsh Construction Co.
was not engaged in any other business while
Harsh Investment Corporation, during the course
of construction, was engag·ed in a considerable
number of activities and expended $1,040,000.00
on items not pertaining to the construction of
Hill Field (T. 450, 475, 1093) and according to
the testimony of William Ellis, controller for
Harsh Investment Corporation, no allocation of
overhead expenses was made on the books of
Harsh Investment Corporation (T. 1043-1044).
3. The sum of $69,557.31 which sum is the ad-
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hereinabove referred to, his illegal withdrawal of
$631,000.00 from Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh
Investment Corporation and the activities of Schnitzer
and Hutchinson in preparing false and fraudulent corporate resolutions during the course of the trial in the
Court below in an attempt to mislead the trial Court
and defraud Locke will be set forth in detail in respond'ent's brief on cross appeal.
IN RE TRIAL COURT'S DffiCISION
The trial Court properly distinguished between construction costs and project costs. Appellants, throughout their brief, attempt to show that Schnitzer, Harsh
Utah Corporation and Harsh Investment Corporation
are to be considered as a singl'e unit and attempt further
to show that the only proceeds available for the construction of Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Project
were the receipts of the mortgage. In accordance with
the preponderance of the evidence, which was established
even by appellants' own witnesses, the trial court properly distinguished between exp'enses that were to be paid
by Harsh Utah Corporation as owner, including the
amount of the Construction Contract-"Lump Sum" and
the expenses to be paid by Harsh Investment Corporation as contractor. (See Appendix, Pages 4 to 7.)
The trial Court properly found that in computing
the bonus to which Locke would be entitled under the
terms and conditions of the contract of October 4th,
1951, that the income was as follows:
1. The amount of the Construction Contract
-"Lump Sum", $2,995,205.00.
2. The amount of the change order 'extras in
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the sum of $178,672.00. However, pertaining to
this figure, the Court selected the amount in accordance with the evidence by which the mortgage
would be increased rather than the sum of
$333,952.55 represtning the total amount pursuant
to the actual agreements betwe'en Harsh Utah
Corporation as owner and Harsh Investment ( 10rporation as builder. This is the subject matter
of Point I of respondent's brief on cross appeal.
3. The net amount of the r'ental income received during the construction period of twentyfour months in the amount of $165,886.49.
The trial Court properly determined the amount of
the construction costs pertaining to the Hill Field Air
Force Base Housing Project as follows:
1. Direct construction costs, $2,656,457.21.

2. Indirect construction costs, to wit, general
overhead, $45,631.34. This amount was the actual
amount of overhead pertaining to Harsh Construction Co. in Montana which involved the construction of 400 units against 350 in Utah and the
expenditure of considerably more money. According to the testimony, Harsh Construction Co.
was not engaged in any other business while
Harsh Investment Corporation, during the course
of construction, was engag·ed in a considerable
number of activities and expended $1,040,000.00
on items not pertaining to the construction of
Hill Field (T. 450, 475, 1093) and according to
the testimony of William Ellis, controller for
Harsh Investment Corporation, no allocation of
overhead expenses was made on the books of
Harsh Investment Corporation (T. 1043-1044}.
3. Th'e sum of $69,557.31 which sun1 is the ad-

22

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ditional amount of judgments rendered by the
trial Court below in favor of sub-contractors and
materialmen that was not computed in the direct
construction costs of $2,656,457 .21.
The trial Court properly eliminated in computing
construction costs under the terms and conditions of the
agreement of October 4th, 1951, the sum of $95,547.30,
which was the amount of the profit of the Pacific Coast
Equipment Co., another corporation totally owned and
controlled by Schnitzer, in making purchases of material and supplies p'ertaining to the Hill Field Air Force
Base Housing Project.
The trial Court properly eliminated a salary to
Harold J. Schnitzer in the amount of $26,250.00 paid to
him by Harsh Investment Corporation during the construction of the Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Project. The agre'ement of October 4th, 1951, did not provide for inter-company profits for the benefit of Schnitzer or a salary for Schnitzer.
The trial Court, in computing the judgment in favor
of Locke did not include as a cost of construction interest
awarded to sub-contractors and materialmen, or th'e sum
of $25,000.00 damages allowed to Moulding Brothers
as a result of Schnitzer's unlawful refusal to pay them
through which they suffered damage to their credit to
the extent of $25,000.00.
During the cours'e of the trial, issues were
to the Court and tried pursuant to certain
Locke pertaining to the California project.
Court properly found that Locke was entitled
the sum of $8,678.00 on his claim.

presented
claims of
The trial
to receive
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The trial Court properly found in its Finding, No.
25 (R. 102) that the total amount of income to Harsh
Investment Corporation was at least the sum of
$3,339,863.49 (respondent still contends that this should
be a greater sum, as will be discussed in his brief on
cross appeal).
The trial Court further properly found that the
construction costs were in the amount of $2, 771,685.86,
leaving a total of construction profits to be divided pursuant to the judgment of the trial Court in the amount
of $568,177.63. The trial Court then allowed Schnitzer
and/or Harsh to retain 10% of the amount of the bid
from the above mentioned profits which was the sum
of $276,700.00, l'eaving a sum to be divided between
Locke and Schnitzer of $291,477.63 or a sum in favor
of Locke of $145,738.81 plus interest of $10,201.71 to
the 31st day of December, 1954, and in addition thereto,
the sum of $8,678.00 plus interest of $534.21 pertaining
to the California project, for a total gross judgment in
favor of Locke of $165, 161.73. The trial Court allowed
as total set-offs in favor of Schnitzer the sum of
$16,878.97, leaving a net judgment in favor of Locke in
the amount of $148,282.76 which was subsequently adjusted by the trial Court in acordance with its amendment to the judgment, R182 and 183, to allow for certain
judgment in favor of painters to the net figure of
$147,905.00.
Respondent contends that in the computation of the
above mentioned judgment, the Court should have included the contract price between Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh Investment Corporation pertaining to
24
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taining to the trial between respondent and appellants
was terminated on June 24th, 1954, is highly improper
and irregular.
Contrary to the statements made by appellants in
their brief that the trial Court was not aware of the
amounts due sub-contractors and materialmen, respondent submits that the Record will show that the trial
Court did, on February 8th, 1955, make the following
Order: "Plaintiff Locke asked that the judgment in
favor of Alvin T. Locke be amended by interlineation
by deducting one-half of the amount paid to the painters,
or in the sum of $377.76, leaving a judgment of
$147,905.00 for Locke. Granted." This order was entered by the trial Court and was well known to app'ellants' counsel and an amended judgment entered pursuant thereto to completely adjust each and every item
in accordance with the Court's decision. (R. 182 and 183)
IN RE WIRING OF SCHNITZER'S HOTEL ROOM
Inasmuch as appellants have devoted a sub-section
in their Statement of Facts to the above entitled subject
and have seen fit to insert it in their brief, respondent
desires to make a few remarks pertaining thereto.
The trial Court found that "Locke had completely
and fully fulfilled all of the duties and obligations as
a general construction superintendent as required under
the terms and conditions of the agreement of October
4th, 1951," Finding No. 12, R. 96. During the course
of the trial and by the pleadings of appellants, they
presented no legitimate defense to Locke's cause of
action but attempted, as a means of defense and counterclaim, to maliciously attack Locke with claims of em27
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bezzlen1ent and fraudulent conduct which appellants
could not and did not support at any time during the
trial. The Court's Findings, Pages 105 and 106 of the
Record, read as follows :
"The Court finds that Locke did not misappropriate or convert to his own use or otherwise misapply any of the monies or property so claimed
by defendants as aforesaid to have been misappropriated or converted by him."
This finding clearly establishes Locke's innocence in
this regard and shows the malicious attack of appellants during the course of the trial.
The series of cas'es in litigation pertaining to the
claims of respondent Locke, other sub-contractors and
materialmen, started on trial before the Honorable
Charles G. Cowley on May 18th, 1954. Respondent's attorney, John M. Sherman, was present in the Court
room during this testimony and respondent Locke was
also present during a large portion of the trial between
May 18th, 1954 and June 8th, 1954, the date respondent's case commeneed. During this intervening time,
respondent was present when considerable false testimony was given by appellant Schnitzer and Robert
Kahn, assistant to Schnitzer, during the Moulding case.
Respondent was, at this time, well aware of the mental
attitude of appellant Schnitzer toward respondent which
is set forth on Pages 247-M-249·-M of the transcript and
which is summarized as follows on Page 249-M, where
the following questions were asked by respondent's attorney of Schnitzer :
"Q. Is it also a fact on that occasion between
28
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Mr. Rawlings office and the Hotel Utah, you said
Sherman, you and Locke will both rot in jail before you ever get a dime out of me on this law
suiU
A. I certainly did make that statement.

Q. You do rem'ember that1
A. I called you a blackmailer and said before
Locke was finished there would be criminal
charges and if you were a criminal lawyer you
had better brush up in the law. I am not ashamed.
You have made all typ'es of threats unethical,
in my opinion, on all occasions. I have heard
nothing but filthy lies from him the past two
days."
The conversation hereinabove recited, the Record will
disclose, took place on April 13th, 1954, and prior to
the trial of the case. As a result thereof, respondent and
his attorney, John M. Sherman, knew that appellant
Schnitzer would go to any extreme, even perjury, to
defeat Locke's claims, and therefore 'engaged the services of Donald H. Terry, on vacation from the Pasadena
Police Department, to conduct an investigation so that
the true facts and circumstances pertaining to the activitres of appellant Schnitzer could be disclosed to the
trial Court.
Donald H. Terry's testimony regarding his investigation is a part of this record, Pages 656 through 721
and resulted in a disclosure to the trial Court that certain testimony pertaining to the preparation of official
minutes and resolutions contained on Pages 17 of Ex.
161 were false and fraudulent and the preparation of Ex.
177, portions of which were dated January 15th. 1952
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and other portions June 15th, 1953, were, in fact, prepared during the course of trial between respondent and
appellants. As a result of respondent's investigation,
appellant Harold J. Schnitzer and one of his witnesses,
an attorney from Portland, Oregon, Walter E. Hutchinson, both confessed to submitting false testimony during
the course of this trial. Respondent submits that the
~extreme measures taken by respondent's attorney were
necessary so that the true facts and circumstances could
be determined and the perjured and false testimony
revealed to the trial Court.
Schnitzer was so determined to defraud Locke out
of his bonus and so determined to discredit Locke in the
eyes of the trial Court by false claims of embezzlement,
that Schnitzer himself was willing to run the risk of
criminal prosecution to defeat the legitimate claims of
Locke.
With this background of falsified records and perjured testimony by Schnitzer, Respondent is concerned
that no argument based on the Peat, Marwick, Mitchell
& Co. audit which is in turn based on records in Schnitzler's possession and control, should be permitted to
cloud a clear view of the facts proved to and found by
the trial Court.
STATEMENT OF POINTS ON APPEAL
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSTRUED THE
AGREEMENT OF OCTOBER 4th, 1951.
A. The preponderance of the evidence shows a
distinction between project costs and construction
costs.
30
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B. The conduct of the parties before litigation
shows a distinction between construction costs and
project costs.
C. The pleadings of Locke are all prop'er.
POINT II.
LEGAL PRINCIPLES SUPPORT THE TRIAL
COURT IN ITS REJECTION OF NON-CONSTRUCTION COSTS.
POINT III.
A PROPER AND ACCURATE ACCOUNTING
SHOWS LOCKE IS ENTITLED TO A BONUS.
A. The Findings of Fact of the trial Court in
re the total receipts are conclusively supported by
the evidence.
B. The Findings of Fact of the trial Court in
r'e expenditures are conclusively supported by the
evidence.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSTRUEn THE
F.H.A. RULES AND REGULATIONS.
POINT V.
THE FINDINGS OF FACT SUBSTANTIATE ADDITIONAL FUNDS DUE LOCKE PERTAINING TO
THE CALIFORNIA PROJECT.
POINT VI.
SET-OFFS DUE BY RESPONDENT LOCKE TO APPELLANTS SCHNITZER AND HARSH INVESTMENT CORPORATION WERE PROPERLY DETERMINED.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSTRUED
THE AGREEMENT OF OCTOBER 4th, 1951.
By reason of the fact that appellants deal in speculation and theory throughout their argument, respondent feels that both time and space can be saved by first
pointing out the errors in appellants' theory and argument before outlining the evidence that will substantiate
respondent's judgment.
Appellants, in Point I, attempt to set forth that the
trial Court misconstrued the agreement of October 4th,
1951, and deal with this subject from Pages 42 through
57 of their brief. In accusing the trial Court of misconstruing the agreement in question, appellants set
forth a fantastic theory by which it would be necessary
to completely disregard the express terms of the October 4th contract as well as certain contracts between
Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh Investment Corporation, to completely disregard F.H.A. rules and regulations, the Mortgage, the Lease and other documents.
At the outset it is seen that under the terms of th'e
contract of October 4, 1951, drawn by Schnitzer and his
attorneys, Locke's bonus is based on the profits earned
"in connection with the construction" of the projects.
The word us'ed is "construction". The parties did not,
although they might have if they had so intended, use
the phrase "in connection with the bidding, planning,
financing, ownership, operation and construction."
Any attempt to expand the meaning of the word construction to embraC'e the meaning of the entire phrase
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above suggested is manifestly absurd and contrary to the
stated intent of the parties.
As the word they used was "construction", it seems
clear that the parties must have intended that in computing the profits and the bonus only construction costs
and construction income were to be considered, unless
otherwise specifically agreed. There were two exceptions: Schnitzer's "finance fee' of 10% of th'e bid, and
rentals received during the construction period as a
result of speeding up construction to completion before
the end of the 24 months period.
Th'e costs of bidding are obviously unrelated to
construction; several bids were made on projects never
constructed by the parties.
The planning of the project by architects and engineers is still not "construction," ev'en though it may be
a necessary pre-requisite thereto, as was the cost of
negotiating a lease for the site and the payment of
rental thereon.
Clearly the costs of financing, such as interest charges, are not "construction," and the parties never intended they should be considered as construction costs,
for the parti'es provided a special "finance fee", or "finance service charge" to reward Schnitzer separately for
undertaking the obligation to finance the project. This
shows that the parties must have contemplated that
"construction" should not embrace financing; otherwise
it would have been unnecessary to provide specially that
the finance fee should be charged against construction
profits before computing the bonus. To argue, as does
appellant, that h'e was entitled both to his finance fee
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and to all costs of financing by way of interest, etc., is
obviously so unreasonable that neither party would have
contemplated it in reaching their agreement.
Elimination of Locke's interest in the own·ership
and operation of the project was one of the clear purposes and intents of the October 4th contract. By that
contract they intended to and did separate ownership
from construction and it must be presumed that Schnitzer intended to assume the customary burdens of ownership along with the privileges that went with it. That
this is true is made quite manifest by the fact that he
caused the "lump sum" construction contract to be executed by which the duties incident to construction are
clearly outlined and separated from those of ownership.
If it had been intended that interest charges, architect's
fees and other expenses of ownership were to be borne
by the construction contractor, that contract would have
so provided.
Respondent Locke, by the terms of the October 4th,
1951, agreement, gave up a valuable ownership interest
in the Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Project and
Great Falls, Montana, Air Force Base Housing Project,
which have a valuation of approximately $7,000,000.00.
The tax-free income to Locke for his ownership interests
would have be'en in excess of $30,000.00 per year.
After having given up these valuable assets, it is certainly not logical to believe, as appellants contend, that
Locke intended to disregard the Construction Contract"Lump Sum" and the other formal documents executed
by appellants in the computation of the bonus due him
under the October 4th, 1951 agreement.
34
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Throughout appellant's brief, they attempt to argue
that appellant Schnitzer, Harsh Utah Corporation and
Harsh Investment Corporation should be considered as
a single unit and further argue the intent of the parties
was to consider appellants as a single unit. However,
this fantastic theory is exposed as false and without
foundation, even by the testimony of appellant Schnitzer himself when he testified, Pages 53 and 54 of the
transcript, as to the relationship between corporations,
as follows:

"Q. Now, Mr. Schnitzer, in transacting business of Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh Investment Corporation, you have transacted business for both corporations, as president, have you
noU
A. I have.
Q. And in your capacity as president of
both corporations, you have directed the business
affairs and activities of both corporations. Isn't
that correct1
A. I have actively directed the business
affairs of both corporations.
Q. And you have also acted in the same
capacity as president and directed the activities
of Pacific Coast Equipment Company in exactly
the same way, have you not~
A. That's correct.
Q. And is it not your custom, or was it not
or has it not been in the past your custom and
practice, to conduct the activities of each one of
these corporations in a separate and distinct
manner and directed their activities as an individual corporation as a separate entity in each
35
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particular

instance~

A. They were managed and directed by myself, each individually in a separate manner, each
corporation stood on its own feet as a separate
and distinct corporation. Their relations between one another were separate and formal.
Q. Then you did, according to your testimony, cause separate books and records of
transactions of each individual corporation to be
maintained separately and individually. Is that
correct1
A. The books of the various corporations are
maintained separately and individually.

Q. And if a transaction was entered into between one corporation and the other corporation,
that transaction was reduced to writing and an
agreement between the two corporations, was it f
A. In many cases, depending upon the
gravity of the situation, a formal agreement between the two corporations was prepared."

A. THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
SHOWS A DISTINCTION BETWEEN PROJECT
COSTS AND CONSTRUCTION COSTS.
Respondent submits that the above set forth testimony of appellant Schnitzer himself clearly indicates
that Schnitzer, himself, did not regard Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh Investment Corporation as a single
unit, but dealt with each corporation as a distinct and
separate entity and executed contracts between the corporations in a formal manner as set forth in the above
testimony. This clearly substantiates the trial Court's
decision in giving full force and effect to the Construct-
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ion Contract-"Lump Sum", and other formal documents
executed between the corporations.
The evidence, both oral and documentary, supports
the Court's decision and finding as to a distinction between the construction costs and project costs.
Harsh Utah Corporation as the owner-manager of
the Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Project was obligated to pay certain costs and expenses of the own'er
over and above the amount of $2,995,205.00 which was
the amount of the Construction Contract - "Lump Sum"
due and payable to Harsh Investment Corporation.
The Court found, in Section 17 of the Findings, R.
98, that Harsh Utah Corporation was obligated to pay
the following expenses over and above the amount of
the Construction Contract - "Lump Sum" and that
the following items should not be considered as construction costs under the agreement of October 4th, 1951
between appellants and respondent Locke:
"(a) F.H.A. examination and inspection
(b) Loan fees
(c) Mortgage placement fee
(d) Architect's compensation
(e) F.H.A. mortgage insurance premiums
(f) Interest on mortgage advances;
(g) Recording fees, title examinations
and/or insurance and legal fees".
The testimony supporting the above stated facts on behalf of respondent is as follows:
1. Milton D. Goldberg, a Certified Public Account-

ant, made an audit of the books and records of Harsh
Investment Corporation and Harsh Utah Corporation,
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Ex.. 201, and testified that the books and records of
Harsh Utah Corpration reflected the payment of certain
costs of the owner corporation as set forth above (T.
573-577). Mr. Goldberg also testified that originally the
books and records of various Harsh companies, to wit
Harsh Montana Corporation and Harsh Construction Co.
were properly set up from an accounting standpoint to
reflect the income to the construction company as an
Account Receivable in the amount of the Construction
Contract - "Lump Sum". These books and records
were later changed to eliminate any Account Receivable
item under the direction of appellant Schnitzer. (T. 549551). See Appendix, Pages 1 to 3.
2. Walter E. Hutchinson, a witness produced by
appellants and who was also secretary of Harsh Utah
Corporation, testified that each of the above mentioned
items were expenses properly chargeable to Harsh Utah
Corporation; that in addition to these charges Harsh
Utah Corporation was also obligated to pay to Harsh
Investment Corporation the amount of the Construction
Contract - "Lump Sum". This testimony by Walter E.
Hutchinson, who was a witness produced by appellants
as the F.H.A. expert and the witness who acted in the
capacity of one of the attorneys for appellants, clearly
establishes that there is a distinction between project
costs to be borne by the owner-manager corporation and
construction costs to be paid by the construction company. This testimony is set forth in the appendix in
respondent's brief at Pages 4 to 7.
3. William Ellis, the controller for Harsh Utah
Corporation and Harsh Investment Corporation, testi38
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fied that the above mentioned items were paid by Harsh
Utah Corporation and were carried on the books of that
corporation as a proper expense to Harsh Utah Corporation. (T. 1080-1081). Mr. Ellis further testified
that the books and records of Harsh Investment Corporation did not reflect an Account Receivable Item as
would be customary in order to prepare a profit and
loss statement (T. 1085-1087); See Appendix Pages 8
to 10; that the transfer of funds from Harsh Utah Corporation to Harsh Investment Corporation was, from
time to time, in the amount designated by appellant
Schnitzer. Respondent submits that the books were not
kept in accordance with acceptable accounting principles
and not in accordance with the contracts as relied upon
by Locke. (T. 534-535, 1087).
4. W. Harold W arick, Chief Mortgage Examiner
for F.H.A. testified that the items set forth above were
proper costs of the owner-manager corporation, Harsh
Utah Corporation (T. 1113-1116), and that in addition
to those items Harsh Utah Corporation was obligated
to pay to Harsh Investment Corporation the amount
of the Construction Contract - "Lump Sum" (T. 11171121, 1151), see Appendix, pages 11 to 15, and further
testified, contrary to appellants' contention, that th'e
F.H.A. in no way dictated or designated the amount of
the Construction Contract - "Lump Sum". (T. 11151116).
5. Respondent's position is further substantiated
in this regard by the following documentary exhibits:
(a) Ex. 188, Financial Requirements for Closing, a
document executed by Harsh Utah Corporation, sets
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forth the following items:
"8. Interest during construction
$105,462
10. Insurance during construction
4,425
11. FHA Mortgage Insurance Premium
13,184
12. FHA Examination fee
7,910
13. FHA Inspection fee
13,184
14. Financing Expense
39,552
15. Title and Recording Expenses
2,000
21. L'egal and organization expense
5,000"
All of said items are in addition to Item 25 of said
exhibit:
"cash required by construction contract
$2,995,205.00."
(b) The Building and Loan Agreement, Ex. 64,
Paragraph 7 on Page 2, reiterates the same items as set
forth above as being an obligation by borrower, Harsh
Utah Corporation. These items were in addition to the
items covered by the Construction Contract- "Lump
Sum" referred to in Paragraph 6, Page 2 of the Building
and Loan Agr'eement.
(c) Construction Contract-"Lump Sum", Ex. 61,
which provides that Harsh Utah Corporation pay to
Harsh Investment Corporation for actual construction
of the Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Project the
sum of $2,995,205.00 and this figure does not include
the items set forth above which were to be paid as direct
costs of Harsh Utah Corporation, the owner-manager
corporation.
In sub-paragraph (a) of Point I, appellants attempt
to argue that the terms of the agreement show an intention to consider all costs and the appellants proce·ed
from Pages 44 through 48 to add to and interpolate into
40·
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this agreement their own theory which is completely and
totally unsupported by the evidence. App'ellants set
forth that the first paragraph of the agreement of
October 4th, 1951 envisioned Harsh Investment Corporation being both the owner-manager corporation and
the contractor. This interpretation is completely impossible under the law. It is true that the original bid
was submitted by Harsh Investment Corporation (T. 8081) and as testified to by both appellant Schnitzer and
respondent Locke (T. 786) at the time the original bid
was submitted Harsh Investment Corporation was to
occupy the position of sponsor and manager and the
proposed construction company was to be the Schnitzer
Construction Co. (T. 81). This clearly establishes the
fact that both parties knew it was necessary to have two
different corporations, one to own and manage and the
other to be the contractor.
Subsequent to the bid it was determined that the
owner-manager corporation had to be a Utah corporation pertaining to the Hill Field project and a Montana
corporation p'ertaining to the Great Falls Montana project. Therefore, appellant Schnitzer caused Harsh
Montana Corporation to be formed to own the Montana
project and Harsh Utah Corporation to be formed to
own the Hill Field Air Force Base Project.
(T. 119).
Appellants would have this Court b'elieve that these
facts were known only to respondent Locke and not
Schnitzer.
It is exceedingly clear from the evidence, testimony
and the contents of Ex. 228, Invitation for Proposal,
that the requirements of separate corporations, one to
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own the project and one to build the project, were known
to both parties prior to entering into the October 4th,
1951 agreement.
At the time of entering into the contract of October
4th, 19·51, it was also very clear by the terms of the
agreement that the construction of the project might be
accomplished by contracting with a totally different
construction company in which neit:lrer Schnitzer nor
respondent Locke had an interest. Efforts were made
to do this with the Utah Construction Company and the
Vitt Construction Company (T. 785) Ex. 227. The contract specifically provided, in that event, that Locke
would receive a minimum of $15,000.00 p'er project bonus
and a maximum of $25,000.00 per project. However,
pertaining to the Hill Field Air Force Base Project,
subsequent to October 4th, 1951, it was decided that
Harsh Utah Corporation would be the owner and therefore Harsh Utah Corporation was incorporated in December of 1951 and, in lieu of incorporating the Schnitzer Construction Co. to be the contractor, Harsh Investment Corporation was designated to be the contractor ( T. 34, 80-81, 786). The 'evidence further discloses that Harsh Investment Corporation was also the
sponsor for the Montana and California projects. However, Harsh Montana Corporation was incorporated in
Montana to be the owner corporation. Harsh Construction Co. was incorporated in Oregon to be the contractor
for both the Montana and California projects and Harsh
California Corporation was incorporated in California
to b'e the owner of the California project (T. 10, 119-120).
On Page 47 of appellants' brief they assert the
42
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argument that because Locke was to receive his bonus
"immediately upon completion of the construction of the
projects awarded to Harsh and receipt by Harsh of profits earned" that this language would preclude Locke
from participating in rental income. However. appellants completely disregard the language of the contract
between Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh Investment
Corporation with respect to the time within whieh the
projeet was to be built whieh was a period of twentyfour months, Ex. 61, during whieh period rental ineome
was reeeived. They completely disregard the fact that
by the terms and conditions of the Construction Contraet-"Lump Sum", Harsh Utah Corporation was to
pay to Harsh Investment Corporation within this
twenty-four month period the sum of $2,995,205.00 plus
any amounts ineurred for ehanges (T. 829). ']~here is
nothing in this language that can b'e construed that
Harsh Investment Corporation aetually intended to reeeive the money direetly from the Government unless
Harsh Investment Corporation was eventually to be
the owner-manager corporation instead of Harsh Utah
Corporation.
On Page 48 of appellants' brief, they attempt to
argue that appellant Harold J. Sehnitzer and appellant
Harsh Investment Corporation should be eonsidered as
one entity and argue that it would be absurd to allow
one party to a joint venture agreement to be required to
pay funds from which another party to the joint venture
agreement would benefit. However, appellants completely ignore the fact that Sehnitz'er was to reeeive 10<}'0
of the amount of the bid beeause he was required to provide the necessary capital, whieh respondent submits
43
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

he failed to do, as will be discussed in r'espondent's brief
on cross-appeal. Appellants further ignore the fact
that Harold J. Schnitzer, through Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh Montana Corporation and Harsh
California Corporation acquired property valued at approximately $10,000,000.00 which was built through the
construction ability and knowledge of respondent Locke
and now attempt to argue that it is absurd that Locke
should receive a bonus as a result of his efforts through
which, according to the testimony, Schnitzer will receive
a $100,000.00 per year tax-free income from his three
projects. (T. 1007-1010, 1134-1136).
Speaking of absurdittes, which appellants seem to
indulge in freely, perhaps appellants can explain why
Schnitzer did not insert in any agreement, nor write a
letter to Locke, that he did not intend to be bound by the
terms and conditions of the Construction Contract"Lump Sum", the terms and conditions of the Mortgage,
the terms and conditions of the Lease, the terms and
conditions of the Committment for Mortgage Insurance
or the terms and conditions of the F.H.A. regulations
insofar as his agreement with Locke was concerned. Or
would this be too flagrant an admission on the part of
appellant Schnitzer that he had been guilty of further
defrauding the United States Governm'ent~
B. THE CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES BEFORE
LITIGATION SHOWS A DISTINCTION BETWEEN
CONSTRUCTION COSTS AND PROJECT COSTS.
Appellants indulge in theory and speculation regarding the conduct of the parties before litigation in
arguing that their conduct indicated an intent to con44
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sider all costs. Respondent submits that the intent of
the parties can better be determined by the various contracts and agreements entered into and the various
documents executed by appellant Schnitzer on behalf of
Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh Investment Corporation as well as the F.H.A. rules and regulations, Ex.
3. The Financial Requirements for Closing, Ex. 188,
clearly sets forth items to be paid by Harsh Utah Corporation totalling $585,442.00 separate and apart from
the amount of the Construction Contract-"Lump Sum"
of $2,995,205.00.
The Building and Loan Agreement, Ex. 64, clearly
sets forth the items and distinguishes between construction costs and project costs, and the Construction Contract-"Lump Sum", Ex. 61, makes a clear and definite
distinction between construction costs and project costs
and clearly indicates that the amount of th'e Construction
Contract-"Lump Sum" was for construction only and
did not include the additional obligations of Harsh Utah
Corporation as owner.
Contrary to the contentions of appellants, as will
be discussed below, the above mentioned documents and
agreements, many of which were executed by appellant
Schnitzer, clearly and definitely establish the intent and
conduct of the parties and distinguish between construction costs and project costs.
In sub-paragraph (b) of Point I, appellants argue
that the conduct of the parti'es was a consideration of
all costs. Respondent admits that it was, on occasions,
necessary to determine all of the project costs. However, the testimony is emphatically clear that there is
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a distinction between project costs, which were paid for
by Harsh Utah Corporation, including the Construction
Contract-"Lump Sum", and construction costs which
were to be paid for by the contractor, Harsh Investment
Corporation. These facts were clearly and emphatically
admitted by Walter E. Hutchinson, an officer of Harsh
Utah Corporation and one of the attorneys representing
appellants, prior to the date of the trial. ~1r. Hutchinson's testimony on this fact is set forth in the Appendix
at Pages 4 to 7.
It is true that Locke made certain mathematical
computations pertaining to project costs and profits.
Appellants refer to certain of these exhibits, all of which
were prepared prior to the October 4th, 1951 agreement
at a time when Locke was a joint venture owner and
entitled to profits from ownership as well as construction (T. 191-M - 195-M.) In this context they are no
proof at all as to the intent under the agreement executed
later. Appellants further recite one instance subsequent to the Octob'er 4th, 1951 agreement, which was
Ex. 223, pertaining to the Rapid City, South Dakota
project. Respondent directs this Court's attention to
the testimony of appellant Schnitzer wherein he admits
that this project was not bid under an agreement with
respondent Locke or under the terms and conditions of
the October 4th, 1951 agreement. (T. 986). Other exhibits, such as Exs. 222, 239, 241 and 226, were all prepared prior to the October 4, 1951 agreement. In this
section, appellants apparently grasp at straws to determine what the mental attitudes of the parties were at
the time of executing the agreement of October 4th,
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change orders in the sum of $333,952.55 instead of the
$178,672.00, which is Point I contained in respondents'
brief on cross appeal. Respondent further contends that
the trial Court should not have allowed Schnitzer to retain $276,700.00 out of the profits of said contract because of Schnitzer's total failure to finance under the
provisions of the October 4th, 1951, agreement. The
discussion of this matter is further contained in Point
II, respondents' brief on cross appeal.
During the course of the trial, Locke admitted being
indebted to Schnitzer in the amount of $11,712.98 and
admitted that in addition thereto, he was indebted to
Schnitzer in the sum of $1,655.93. During the course
of the trial, there was disputed testimony concerning the
purchase of a truck load of lumber and the trial Court
found that Locke should reimburse Schnitzer $1,200.00
for this item. In addition to that, the Court awarded to
Schnitzer the sum of $1,000.00 as and for attorney's fees
pertaining to the above mentioned promissory note.
IN RE FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL
COURT BOTH BEFORE1 AND AFTER FORMAL
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW.
Apellants submitted objections and arguments to the
proposed Findings of Fact. Appellants also attempted
to introduce additional evidence, one of which was a
proposed accounting submitted by Card Greaves, CPA,
which was rejected by the trial Court on the basis that
all of the information was before the Court during the
course of trial.This exhibit was Ex. 446. Now, in appellants' brief they attempt to submit additional matters,
25.
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which respondent submits is improper, before this Court
in the form of the Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. report
attached to the appendix of the brief of appellants,
Pages 19 through 35. This is similar to Ex. 446, the
Card Greaves Report hereinabove referred to, which is
also referred to by appellants in their brief but which
was rejected by the trial Court.
During the course of the trial, William Ellis, the
controller of Harsh Investment Corporation, testified
on several occasions. All of the books and records were
befor'e the trial Court during the entire trial. In the
event that appellants desired to submit any additional
accounting evidence, they could have done so, and on
Page 446 of the transcript, Mr. King, appellants' counsel,
makes the following reply when asked by the Court if
Mr. Greaves would be a witness during the trial:
"Greaves will not be here if Goldberg testifies properly".
Therefore, it can only be assumed that appellants did not
desire to call Mr. Greaves as he did not appear to be a
witness and admit that Mr. Goldberg testified properly.
Respondent submits that all of the books and records of
the various Harsh companies have been under the control of appellants since the date the trial closed and
respondent has had no opportunity to know how or in
what manner any entries were made in said books or
for what reason and further, because Mr. Ellis testified
during the course of the trial that the books contained
all of the costs pertaining to the Hill Field Air Force
Base Housing Project except the judgments rendered by
the trial Court, that to now attempt to insert a report
prepared under date of September 15th, 1955, as an appendix to their brief, when all of the testimony per-
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IOfi

1951. There is absolutely nothing in the Record to support their theory and argument and yet they completely
ignore and disregard the physical acts and conduct of
Harold J. Schnitzer in the execution of written documents on behalf of both corporations, the acknowledgement of F.H.A. rules and regulations that both corporations must be kept separate, apart, and distinct from
each other, and formal documents as well as testimony
of Schnitzer set forth above.
C.

THE PLElADINGS OF LOCKE ARE
ALL PROPER.
Sub-paragraph (c) of appellants' Point I attempts
to assert that the pleadings show a theory considering
all costs and argue on this point on Pages 54 through 57.
Respondent submits that the pleadings themselves
clearly assert a cause of action by respondent Locke
against Harold J. Schnitzer individually, Harsh Investment Corporation and Harsh Utah Corporation and it
is true that Locke has rep'eatedly made claims of all appellants. However, there is nothing in the pleadings or
in the record that substantiates appellants' contention
that all of the appellants were to be considered in any
different capacity than the Record itself discloses them
to actually be. Appellants assert that all appellants
must be considered together as one unit in order for
Locke to receive any sum whatsoever as a bonus from
the profits. This fact is absolutely untrue and is not
substantiated in any way by the evidence. Th'e accounting will specifically show the amount Harsh Utah Corporation was obligated to pay to Harsh Investment
Corporation to construct the project. It will specificaly show the amount that Harsh Utah Corporation was
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to pay to Harsh Investment Corporation for extras and
will specifically show the amount of rental incom'e r~
ceived during the construction period and from said
funds the amount which Locke should receive for a
bonus. These items will be discussed in more detail
later in this br~ef and in respondent's brief on cross
appeal.
The fact that repeated references were made to
Harsh Utah Corporation, Harsh Investment Corporation
and Harold J. Schnitzer throughout respondent Locke's
complaint was necessitated by the fact that Locke had
absolutely no knowledge as to where the money had
gone that was received from the Irving Trust Co. and
the funds required by the Government to be placed in
escrow. The evidence will clearly show that these funds
were indiscriminately and improperly withdrawn by
Harold J. Scnitzer in violation of th'e contracts and
agreements and in order to properly trace these funds
from various corporations to the other and eventually
into the pocket of Harold J. Schnitzer, it was necessary
to use the terminology used by respondent Locke in his
complaint in intervention.
Insofar as Locke is concerned, the evidence and testimony is complete that he considered the various corporations distinct and separate 'entities and that he relied
upon the Construction Contract-"Lump Sum" and other
formal documents executed (T. 184-M, 784-786, 794-796).
See appendix Pages 40, 41. Respondent submits that
the Court properly distinguished betwe'en construction
costs and project costs and the amounts to be paid by
Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh Investment Corporation.
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CONCLUSION
It is exceedingly clear from the evidence hereinabove set forth, both from oral testimony and from documentary evidence introduced, that there was a distinct
division between the obligations of Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh Investment Corporation, which unequivocably supports the lower Court's Findings of Fact
and in particular Finding No. 17, R. 98, which is as
follows:
"In computing the profits to be divided pursuant
to the contract, Exhibit "A" [the agreement of
October 4th, 1951] distinction must be made betwe'en construction costs and project costs. Project costs include certain expenses of Harsh Utah
Corporation as the owner-management corporation, consisting of the following items:
(a) F.H.A. examination and inspection;
(b) Loan fees;
(c) Mortgage placement f·ee;
(d) Architect's compensation;
(e) F.H.A. mortgage insurance premiums;
(f) Interest on mortgage advances ;
(g) Recording fees, title examinations and/or
insurance and legal fees,
said items being in the total amount of One
Hundred Fifty-seven Thousand Four Hundred
Forty Two and 76/100 dollars ($157,442.76). This
expense is not a cost of construction and is not
chargeable as an expense of Harsh Investment
Corporation in computing th'e construction profit
to be divided between the parties to the contract
Exhibit "A"." [The October 4th, 1951 agreement.]
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Respondent further submits that the testimony and
documents h'ereinabove referred to supports respondent's position and the audit of Milton D. Goldberg, Ex.
201, in eliminating these expenses of Harsh Utah Corporation as not properly being chargeable to the construction contract under the terms of the agreen1ent of
October 4th, 1951 between the parties.
POINT II.
LEGAL PRINCIPLES SUPPORT THE TRIAL
COURT IN ITS REJEiCTION OF NONCONSTRUCTION COSTS.
Respondent has no argument with the legal principles declared in cases cited in appellants' brief pertaining to legal principles, Point II. However, respondent does not agree in any manner with the argument
of appellants attempting to apply those principles in ascertaining the intent of the parties at the time of entering into the agreement of October 4th, 1951. The actual
intent of the parties can best be determined by their
previous agreements and conduct. By the terms of Exs.
157 and 158, Locke had a joint venture interest in the
construction and the ownership of certain Wherry
Housing Projects. He was induced by appellant Schnitzer's fals'e and fraudulent representations to part with
this ownership interest so that Schnitzer could finance
the project by selling stock in the ownership corporation, which Schnitzer did not do (T. 32-M, 33-M, 41-M;
77-79). Under the agreement of October 4th, 1951, Locke
was divested of his ownership interest in the Wherry
Housing Projects at Great Falls, Montana and the Hill
Field Air Force Base, having a replacement value of
50
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

[.

some $7,000,000.00. Locke's income as a one-half owner
of these projects would have b'een in excess of $30,000.00
per year over the period of the lease, 75 years. (T. 10071010; 1134-1136). With a background of these very apparent facts, it is impossible to understand app'ellants'
contentions as to the theoretical intentions of the parties.
To follow appellants' theory it would be necessary
to contend, ridiculously, that the United States Government, through F.H.A., was to provide all of the fnnds
necessary to build the Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Project and then allow Harold J. Schnitzer to own
it and collect rents for his own benefit for a period of
75 years and yet never to have invested any funds whatsoever in said project. For appellants to argue that
the only funds available were mortgage funds is in complete violation of the F.H.A. rules and regulations as
contained in Ex. 3, the Commitment for :Mortgage Insurance, Ex. 186, the Mortgage, Ex. 63 and the Construction Contract-"Lump Sum", Ex. 61, and the agreement of October 4th, 1951 with Locke.
Respondent submits that in the initial instance, in
order to have a profit, in connection with the "construction" of the project, under any conceivable definition of
the word, there must first b'e income and secondly, expenses, in connection with such construction, and how
and in what manner appellants can continually attempt
to establish an argument showing the intention of the
parties that the mortgage proceeds were to be considered
as construction income, when in every conceivable definition and from the evidence, both oral and documentary, the mortgage proceeds are definitely offset by the
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equal mortgage liability, is impossible to understand.
The uncontroverted evidenc'e submitted during the
course of the trial is, both from the testimony of Mr.
Goldberg, (T. 571-572), see Appendix Page 42, and Mr.
Ellis, (T. 1085-1086), to the effect that mortgage proceeds are not income, and the receipt thereof creates a
liability on the mortgage note.
To argue that respondent Locke, at any time, intended to bind himself to the theory set forth in appellants' brief is without merit or justification in any
manner whatso'ever. There is absolutely no conceivable
method in the world of providing any income for the
construction under the terms and conditions of the agreement of October 4, 1951 between the parties or in any
other mann'er whatsoever unless the amount of the Construction Contract-"Lump Sum" plus the change order
extras are to be considered the established income of
the construction company. The evidence clearly and
unequivocably !establishes this to be a fact and this to
be the true intent of the parties (T. 781, 990-992). The
evidence further discloses that the original books were
set up on proper accounting principles showing the contract amount as an account receivable to the construction company and were subsequently altered under the
direction of Harold J. Schnitzer. (T. 550-551, 534-535).
By using th'e phrase "profits earned . . . in connection with the construction" of the project, the parties
made manifest their intention to separate construction
profits from overall project profits, and construction
costs from project costs.
The situation and background of the parties, con52
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sidered in the light of the authorities cited by appellant,
fortifies rather than weakens the conclusion of the trial
court that the contract of the parties intended to and did
require a distinction between construction costs and project costs.
The facts (1) that Locke was the construction expert, (2) that Locke by the contract surrendered all ownership in and control over the proj'ect, as distinguished
from construction, (3) that Schnitzer was to be paid a
special fee of $276,700 for financing the project, and
hence was expected to bear all the costs of financing, ( 4)
the knowledge poss'essed by all parties that an ownermanager corporation separate from the constructing
corporation would, under F.H.A. rules, have to be
organized, ( 5) the acts of Schnitzer in setting up a
"lump-sum construction contract between his corporations, without requiring therein the contractor to pay
non-construction project costs, and (6) in originally
causing the lump-sum contract price to be set up on
Harsh books as an account receivable, all argue that,
except as specifically provided on the fiance fee, only
construction costs were intended to be considered.
The conclusion reached by the trial court is obviously sound in fact and law, and should be affirmed on
this point.
POINT III
A PROPER AND ACCURATE ACCOUNTING
SHOWS LOCKE! IS ENTITLED TO A BONUS
A. THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL
COURT IN RE THE TOTAL RECEIPTS
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ARE CONCLUSIVELY SUPPORTED BY
THE EVIDENCE.
The trial Court properly and accurately determined
the amount of income with the exception of th·e amount
of change order extras (see Point I, respondent's brief
on cross appeal). The following is a summary of the
testimony and evidence p'ertaining to the income during
the construction period:
1. The Construction Contract-"Lump Sum" between Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh Investment
Corporation in the amount of $2,995,205.00, Ex. 61. This
is the figure used by Mr. Goldberg in his audit, Ex. 201,
as part of the gross income to Harsh Investment Corporation. (T. 571-572). See appendix, Page 42. Mr.
Goldberg testified that he obtained this figure from the
contract which was presented to him after some little
argument by appellant Schnitzer. (T. 533-535).
(a) During the trial Ex. 182 was introduced which
was an affidavit submitted by Harold J. Schnitzer claiming that there was a loss on the Montana and Utah
Projects. In support thereof, Mr. Schnitzer attached
Exs. A and B repr'esenting that these were audits made
by Card Greaves, a Certified Public Accountant of Portland, Oregon, employed as the accountant and auditor
for the Harsh Companies. Mr. Goldberg testified pertaining to the Card Greaves r'eports, that they were not,
under acceptable accounting procedures, in any way a
profit and loss statement; that the Card Greaves reporb
attached to Ex. 182 were only itemizations of costs. Mr.
Goldberg further testified that in conversations witt
Mr. Greaves in Portland, Oregon, at the time he wa~
making the audit, Mr. Greaves acknowledged that thE
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reports attached to Ex. 182 did not purport to be profit
and loss statements. Mr. Greaves further acknowledged
that he had never, at any time, had access to the contracts between the owning corporations and the contracting corporations to determine what the amount of
the income to th'e construction company should have
been. ~Ir. Goldberg's testimony pertaining to Ex. 182
and his conversations with Mr. Greaves is contained at
T. 465-473; 588-591. His testimony under cross examination by Mr. King pertaining to the fact that Mr. Greaves
did not represent his reports to be profit and loss statements and that he had not had access to the amount of
the income to the contracting corporations is set forth
in the appendix at Page 43.
(b) The testimony of Walter E. Hutchinson, the
F.H.A. attorney for appellant Schnitzer and S'ecretary
of Harsh Utah Corporation, was that this was a contract entered into between the owner-manager corporation, Harsh Utah Corporation, and the contractor, Harsh
Investment Corporation, (T. 829), and that the F.H.A.
in no way dictated the amount of this contract. Mr.
Hutchinson's testimony in this respect is set forth in
the appendix at Pages 5 to 7.
(c) Respondent directs this Court's attention to
Article III of Construction Contract-"Lump Sum", Ex.
61, which reads as follows :
"Article III - The Contract Sum. The owner
shall pay the contractor for the performance of
the contract, subject to additions and deductions
provided herein, on account of construction, the
sum of $2,995,205.00 cash".
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This terminology clearly supports respondent's position
that this amount was to be paid for construction only.
(d) W. Harold Warwick, Chief Mortgage Examiner
for F.H.A., testifted that the F.H.A. did not in any way
dictate to either the owner-manager corporation or the
contracting corporation the amount of the Construction
Contract-"Lump Sum" (T. 1116). Appellants throughout their entire brief contend that the only funds available for the construction of tlre project were receipts
from mortgage funds. This theory is completley erroneous, and the testimony of Mr. Warwick, in this respect,
setting forth that at the time the original project was
started the total funds availabl'e for the entire project,
is as follows :
"A total of the mortgage loan, $2,636,800.00, plus
$651,690.00, or a total of $3,288,490.00"
which Mr. King himself. computed as set forth on Page
1115 of the transcript. This figure did not include the
change order extras which were subsequently testified
to by Mr. Warwick and which will be set forth hereinafter in this brief.
2. Change Order extras were additional contracts
between Harsh Utah Corporation as the owner and
Harsh Investment Corporation as contractor for the
performance of additional work over and above tlle
original plans and specifications pertaining to Hill Field
Air Force Base Housing Project, Ex. 1.
(a) By the terms and conditions of the Construction
Contract-"Lump Sum," Ex. 61, the contractor is entitled to extras for change orders in accordanC'e with the
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specifications, Ex. 1. Article XV of said specifications,
Ex. 1, reads as follows :
"Article XV. Changes in Work .... Owner, without invalidating the contract, may order extra
work, or make changes by altering, adding to or
deducting from the work, the contract sum b'eing
adjusted accordingly .... the value of any such
extra work or change shall be determined in one
or more of the following ways :
(a) By estimate and acceptance in a lump sum
(b) By unit price named in the contract or subsequently agreed upon
(c) By cost and percentage or by cost and a fixed
fee".
The testimony is to the effect that the procedure followed by Harsh Utah Corporation as owner and Harsh
Investment Corporation as contractor was in accordance
with Sub-section (a) above, by estimate and acceptance
in a lump sum. (T. 829). See Appendix Page 16.
(b) Respondent directs this Court's attention to the
language of the change orders which ar'e Exs. 164 and
196 and are further identified as F.H.A. Form No. 2437,
which is as follows :
"Contractor, Mortgagor and mortgagee indicate by signing this r'equest: It is the expressed
intention to execute the changes described herein;
it is understood that F.H.A. acceptance will be
determined without regard to cost and in no way
implies acceptance of or concurrence with mortgagor's statement of cost; it is understood that
when F.H.A. has 'estimated and summarized the
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costs of all accepted changes and the net effect
thereof is a decrease in the total construction
cost, the insurable mortgage amount may be
similarly decreas'ed, but if the net effect is an increase above the mortgage amount the additional
costs will be defrayed by the mortgagor".
Respondent submits that this is a binding contract
between the mortgagor, Harsh Utah Corporation, and
the contractor, Harsh Investment Corporation, each and
every change order being signed by both corporations.
(c) The testimony of Arthur Izakson, of the F.H.A.,
is to the effect that the only function of F.H.A. in regard to change orders is not pertaining to the dollar
amount b'etween owner and contractor but pertains only
to approval of the change to be made insofar as F.H.A.
is concerned, and to act in an advisory capacity insofar
as the mortgagee is concerned to determine the insurable value of any increase in the mortgage. (T. 279-282,
435-437). Appendix 30-32.
(d) The testimony of W. Harold Warwick is to
the effect that if there was no other written agreement
between Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh Investment
Corporation, the language of the change orders themselves as mortgagor and mortgagee would be a binding
contract between the two. (T. 1123-1125). Appen. 27-29.
(e) Appellant Harold J. Scnitz'er admits in his
testimony that Harsh Investment Corporation was entitled to receive additional funds from Harsh Utah Corporation but during his testimony limits the amount of
these funds to the amount of the mortgage increase
rather than th'e amount of the actual change orders

58

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

executed between Harsh Utah Corporation as owner and
Harsh Investment Corporation as contractor (T. 100101).
Respondent's position in this matter will be discussed in more detail in his brief on cross appeal, Point
I thereof.
(f) Respondent Locke's testimony, which is clearly
supported by the above set forth testimony and record,
clearly establishes that change order extras were income to the contractor, Harsh Investment Corporation.
(T. 795-796).
(g) The trial Court, in determining the amount of
change order extras in its Finding of Fact, established
the amount of the additional income to Harsh Investment
Corporation in the sum of $178,672.00, R. 99, Paragraph
20, Sub-paragraph (b). This figure was taken directly
from the testimony during th'e time of trial, that Harsh
Utah Corpporation, as mortgagor, would receive this
amount in increased mortgage funds.
Respondent's
position, as will be set forth in his brief on cross appeal,
is that it should have been the sum of $333,952.55 in accordance with the change orders submitted between
Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh Investment Corporation, irrespective of the amount by which the mortgage would be increased.
(h) Arthur Izakson, inspector for the F.H.A., testified that pertaining to change orders No. 1 through No.
79, 'exclusive of No. 77, that the F.H.A. had approved a
mortgage increase in the amount of $169,576.00 (r_t\ 302303) and further testified that, pursuant to stipulation
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and testimony, the recommendation for mortgage increase pertaining to change order No. 77, was in the
amount of $9,096.00 (T. 435). These two amounts total
the amount used by the trial Court of $178,672.00. This
is the only amount before the trial Court pertaining to
the mortgage increase approved by F.H.A. Mr. Izakson
also testified that the amount that Harsh Utah Corporation, as owner, represented that it would pay to Harsh
Investment Corporation, as contractor, for these change
orders was in the total amount of $333,952.55 (T. 298303; 434-435). See appendix, Pages 30 to 32.
(i) Respondent desires to direct the Court's attention to the Goldberg audit, Ex. 201, in which the
figure of $169,000.00 was used, th'e testimony in this
regard being that this figure was supplied to Mr. Goldberg by appellant Schnitzer at the time the audit was
made in Portland, Oregon, and without regard to any
judicial determination of the contractual effect of said
change orders. ( T. 535-537).
3. The net amount of rental income received from
the lease of Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Project
during the construction period was in the amount of
$165,986.49, R. 99.
(a) Harsh Investment Corporation as the contractor had a p'eriod of twenty-four months within which
to construct the project which period ran from the month
of July, 1952, the date of executing the mortgage and
Construction Contract - "Lump Sum", through the
month of June, 1954 ( T. 114, 115). This period of time
is further substantiated by the following documents and
exhibits: The Mortgage, EiX. 63, the Construction Con60
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tract-"Lump Sum", Ex. 61, and the Commitment for
Mortgage Insurance, Ex. 186.
(b) Respondent Locke testified that there was an
agreement between himself and appellant Schnitzer to
the effect that the income from rentals during the above
mentioned twenty-four month period of construction
would be included in computing Locke's interest under
the contract of October 4th, 1951 (T. 42-M - 45-M, 797).
(c) During the course of trial certain documentary
evidence was introduced to support respondent's position
that the rental income during the construction period
should be taken into consideration in computing the
amount of bonus due Locke. Appellant Schnitzer testified that the relationship between the owner-manager
corporations in Montana, Utah and California, and the
Construction Companies being Marsh Construction Co.
in Montana and California and Harsh Investment Corporation in Utah, was the same (T. 119, 120). The evidanc'e will further show that appellant Harold J. Schnitzer admitted that rental income during the above mentioned construction period was taken into consideration
in making the original bid and that this income during
the construction period had been calculated to derfay
certain costs. Docum'ents submitted by respondent to
substanticate this fact during the course of the trial were
certain letters written by the vairous Harsh companies
and signed by Harold J. Schnitzer, Exs. 181, 184, 185,
231 and 233.
(d) Respondent Locke testified that during the
course of construction a considerable amount of overtime was spent by Harsh Investment Corporation in an
effort to obtain early occupancy by tenants of Hill Field
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Air Force Base Housing Project so that the rental income could start at the earliest possible mom·ent. (T.
795 ). See Appendix 40-41. The expenditure of this
overtime was also verified by appellant Schnitzer (T.
916, 996).
(e) The amount of the rental income as set forth
by the trial Court in its findings, R. 99, 100 and 101, is
supported by the record as follows : The gross rental
income for the period of July 1st, 1953 to March 31st,
1954 is in the amount of $163,235.83, Ex. 203. The rental
income from the period of April 1st, 1954 to June 30th,
1954 is in the amount of $84,795.81 which figure is taken
from the exhibit admitted into evidence by stipulation
and submitted by appellant, Harsh Utah Corporation,
Ex. 442, making a total gross income of $248,031.64. The
operating expenses for the above mentioned period are
shown on Pages 100 and 101 of the Record and are taken
from Exs. 203 and 442. However, the trial Court properly deducted certain amounts, such as management fees
paid directly to appellant, Harold J. Schnitzer, and prorated insurance premiums, allowing a total, net operating expense for the construction p'eriod of $82,045.15,
which amount deducted from the total income set forth
above properly establishes the net rental income for the
construction period in tlte amount of $165,986.49. The
Court properly disallowed interest on mortgage advancements as not being a proper deduction under the terms
and conditions of the October 4th, 1951 agreement.
1

App'ellants, in Point III of their brief, sub-paragraph (a) thereof, contend that the total receipts of the
project were improperly and inaccurately calculated.
62
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Under this section appellants argue that Schnitzer, as
president of Harsh Utah Corporation, signed the Construction Contract-"Lump Sum' to pay to Harsh Investment Corporation the sum of $2,995,205.00 and that
Harsh Utah Corporation obtained a contract from the
Government to act as owner-manager of this project
and to receive all of the rental income therefrom, but
that Harold J. Schnitz'er, as president of Harsh Utah
Corporation, did not intend to carry out the terms and
conditions of these agreements which were the fundamental basis and inducement for the United States
Government to designate and accept Harsh Utah Corporation as the owner-manager of the Hill Field Air
Force Base Housing Project.
In this section, appellants again completely ignore
the testimony of their own witnesses, which was supported by the testimony of W. Harold Warwick, pertaining to the determination of the Construction Contract
- " Lump Sum". Respondent submits that this testimony clearly confirms the judgment of the trial Court
in differentiating between project costs and construction
costs and in establishing the Construction Contract "Lump Sum" to be a portion of the income to the construction company. The testimony regarding these facts
is set forth in the appendix to respondent's brief at Page
4 to 7; 22.
On Page 73 of their brief, appellants argue that the
amount of the original bid submitted was less than the
amount of the Construction Contract - "Lump Sum"
and again argue as to the total amount of the proceeds
received, referring to Ex. 443 which exhibit was not ad63
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mitted in evidenc'e by the Court. Appellants apparently
ignore the requirements of the Commitment for Mortgage Insurance pertaining to the bid which required
considerable extra cash over and above the amount of
the bid and in excess of the amount of the mortgage as
a condition of awarding the project itself to the Harsh
Utah Corporation. The testimony emphatically states
that the amount of the Construction Contract - "Lump
Sum" was determined after considering all of the factors
and was not dictated to by F.H.A. but in the event that
the Construction Contract - "Lump Sum" was lowered
the effect would be that Schnitzer would have to invest
more money in Harsh Utah Corporation which apparently he did not desire to do (T. 341-342, 1115-1116,
1123-1124). See Appendix P. 4-7; 22; 27-29.
At the bottom of Page 73 and the top of Page 74
of their brief, appellants further make reference to
Ex. 443 which was not admitted into evidence and is not
a part of tlre Record of the trial Court.
On Page 74, appellants further set forth portions
of the October 4th, 1951 agreement between respondent
and appellants. However, respondent submits that thes'e
provisions did not come into effect in the construction
of the Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Project and
were to only be considered between the parties in the
event that some third party, such as Utah Construction
Company, performed the entire construction contract.
(T. 185).
It is submitted that the accountings admitted by
the Court below were 'entirely proper and supported by
the evidence with the exception of change order extras
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as will be discussed in respondent's brief on cross appeal.
App'ellants argue that certain interest payments,
totalling $105,845.39, were bonafide construction expenses of Harsh Utah Corporation during the construction
period. This is not a true and correct statement of fact
and is not supported by the books and records of Harsh
Utah Corporation itself. Appellant Schnitzer testified
on Page 124 of the transcript, as follows:
By 1\:fr. Sherman:

"Q. Interest and depreciation, those items
having been eliminated from the books and records of Harsh Utah Corporation, as they stood
on March 31, 1954 ~
A. I do not think the Harsh Utah Corporation books have ever shown interest payments."
The trial Court properly found, under the terms of
the contract of October 4th, 1951 that the net rental
income should be added to the income of Harsh Investment Corporation to offset substantial payments of
over time expended for the purpose of obtaining early
rental income. In considering the amount of net rental
income so far as the agreement of October 4th, 1951 is
concerned, the Court properly eliminated interest and
depreciation. App'ellant Schnitzer testified during the
course of the trial that the net rental income received
during the 24-months' construction period was calculated as income in submitting the original bid . (T. 120,
121).
Again, in the conclusion on the argum'ents pertaining to receipts, appellants attempt to include all corporations and Harold J. Schnitzer as a single unit and
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completely disregard the contractual obligations entered into by said corporations and by Harold J. Schnitzer individually.
In this connection it should be observed that under
familiar equitable principles the corporate fiction or
entity will be disregarded whenever necessary to prevent the perpetration of a fraud, but will never be
disregarded where to do so would aid a cheat to defraud
his intended victim. Hence the trial court very properly
refused to allow Schnitzer to drain off the construction profits through the medium of his alter ego, Pacific
Coast Equipment Co., but insisted that the construction
profit be computed on the basis of the construction contract between Harsh Investment Corporation and Harsh
Utah Corporation as separate entities with separate
functions.
Western Securittes Co. v. Spiro, 62 Utah 623,
221 Pac. 856 ;
Geary v. Cain
79 Utah 268, 9 Pac. 2d 396;
Salina Canyon Coal Co. v. Klemm
76 Utah 372, 290 Pac. 161
(Syllabus No. 24)
CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits that the trial Court
properly determined that the Construction Contract "Lump Sum" was, as established by the eviednce and
record, a proper income item to Harsh Investment Corporation as the contractor. This fact was established
under cross examination of appellants' own witnesses,
to wit, their controller, William Ellis, the secretary of
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tlte Harsh Utah Corporation and its F.H.A. attorney
Walter E. Hutchinson, by the testimony of W. Harold
Warwick, the F.H.A. authority, and by a preponderance
of all other testimony on this subject together with the
documentary evidence supporting same
The trial Court determined that the amount of
change order extras to be in the amount of the mortgage increase of $178,672.00, as supported by the record.
However, respondent still contends that the trial Court
should have computed the amount, not on the basis of
increase in mortgage, but on the basis of the change
orders executed between the owner and the contractor,
in the sum of $333,952.55 as will be set forth in responddent's brief on cross appeal.
·
The trial Court properly determined, from a preponderance of evidence, the correct amount of rental
income to be considered under the terms and conditions
of the October 4th, 1951 agreement in the total amount
of $165,986.49. This amount is supported by the gr'eat
weight of testimony and documentary evidence and there
is absolutely no evidence of any merit whatsoever in
the record of the trial Court that this figure should not
properly be included under the terms and conditions of
the agreement of October 4th, 1951 between the respondent and app'ellants.
B. THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE
TRIAL COURT IN REi EXPENDITURES ARE
CONCLUSIVELY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
The trial Court in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law properly and accurately determined the
amount of expenses.
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1. The Trial Court, in accordance with the testi.
mony and evidence offered during the course of thE
trial, prop'erly and accurately determined the amount
of construction costs in three categories:
(a) Direct construction costs
(b) Indirect construction costs
(c) An adjustment in accordance with the
amount of judgments rendered by the trial Court
to other litigants in this action.
2. The direct construction costs were determined by
the trial Court to be in the amount of $2,656,457.21.
This is the amount testified to by Milton D. Goldberg,
Certified Public Accountant, who audited the books and
records of Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh Investment Corporation pertaining to tire Hill Field Air Force
Base Housing Project and is contained on the last page
of Ex. 201.
(a) The direct construction costs a hove mentioned
eliminated inter-company profits between Pacific Coast
Equipment Co. owned, operated and controlled by appellant Schnitzer, on merchandise purchased by Pacific
Coast Equipment Co. and sold to Harsh Investment Corporation. The terms and conditions of the October 4th,
1951 contract between respondent and appellants did
not provide for any inter-company profits in favor of
appellant Schnitzer or any of his corporations. This
point is apparently conceded by appellants since they
made certain inter-company adjustments between Pacific
Coast Equipment Co. and Harsh Investment Corporation by preparing an agreement to do same during the
course of the trial and dating it back. Said agreement
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is Ex. 177. The controller for the Harsh companies,
William Ellis, testified that the adjustment p'ertaining
to Ex. 177 only left sufficient profit in the Pacific Coast
Equipment Co. to pay the salary of Harold J. Schnitzer.
(T. 1099-1101). Respondent submits that the entire
transactions between Pacific Coast Equipment Co. and
Harsh Investment Corporation pertaining to Hill Field
Air Force Base Housing Project should be 'eliminated
and that Harold J. Schnitzer should not be permitted to
receive funds as a salary, either from Harsh Investment
and/or Pacific Coast Equipment Co., under the terms
and conditions of the October 4th, 1951 agreement.
(b) The elimination in Ex. 201 of the items to be
charged and paid by Harsh Utah Corporation has been
discussed by respondent under Point II of this brief and
will not be discussed further here.
(c) The testimony of William Ellis, the controller
of Harsh Investment Corporation was to the effect that
the Card Greaves report submitted by appellants as
Ex. 182 and the Goldberg audit, Ex. 201 were, in his
opinion as controller for tlre Harsh companies, in substantial agreement insofar as construction costs were
concerned (T. 1039).
3. The trial Court, by its Findings of Fact, R. 101,
determined that the amount of the indirect construction
costs, which was general overhead, of Harsh Investm'ent
Corporation should be in the amount of $45,631.34.
(a) This amount is fair and reasonable between the
parties inasmuch as it was the amount of general overhead pertaining to th'e Great Falls Montana Air Force
Base Housing Project, which involved a larger number
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of units, to wit, 400 units, and the expenditure of large
sums of money than did the 350 units at Hill Fiel1
Air Force Base Housing Project.
(b) The evidence and record clearly discloses, a:
does the testimony of appellants' witness, William Ellis
that Harsh Investment Corporation, during the perio<
of time that it was engaged in the construction of Hil
Field Air Force Base Housing Project, was also ·engagec
in other business activities (T. 450, 475, 1093). EHis fur
ther testified that there had been no direct allocatior
of overhead expens'e between these various business en.
terprises (T. 1043, 1044). Ellis further testified tha1
during the course of construction of Hill Field Air Form
Base Housing Project, Harsh Investment Corporatior
expended the sum of $1,040,505.00 on business activitie~
other than Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Projec1
(T. 475).
(c) Respondent submits that appellants should havE
or could have segregated overhead expens'es pertaining
to Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Project but did
not, at any time, attempt to do so. The books and records were under the control of appellants at all times.
It would be inequitable and unfair to charge the full
amount of overhead on the books and records of Hars~
Investment Corporation in an accounting pertaining tc
respondent Locke's interest in the contract of Octobe1
4th, 1951, and thus penaliz'e Locke for Schnitzer's failurE
to keep proper books and make proper apportionments.
4. The trial Court, in determining the additiona:
amount of construction costs, pursuant to the judgmenh
rendered in the litigation before the trial Court, proper!~
70
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and accurately computed the amount as $69,597.31.
(a) According to the testimony of Milton D. Goldberg, which was corroborated by William Ellis, the sum
of $176,781.27 was carried on the books and records of
Harsh Investm'ent Corporation at the time of the Goldberg audit and was included in the total sum of direct
construction costs of $2,656,457.21.
(b) In computing the additional amounts awarded
by the trial Court, the total judgments computed
by the trial Court, exclusive of penalties and interest,
were as follows :
Gresham Roofing Co. ______________________________ $ 16,807.72
Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Co.________ 35,296.90
Vitt Construction ------------------------------------ 129,191.22
Moulding Brothers ---------------------------------- 36,083.34
Waterfall Construction Co. ------------------ 22,500.00
Utah Fire Clay Co. ---------------------------------6,499.40
being a total of ----------------------------------------$246,378.58
From this amount was deducted the amount of $176,781.27, which established that the additional amount of construction costs, taking into consideration the judgments
awarded by the Court below, was in th'e amount of
$69,597.31 over and above direct construction costs previously computed, which was the figure used by the
trial Court, R. 101 and 102.
(c) The trial Court properly eliminated interest and
costs and the sum of $25,000.00 damages allowed to
Moulding Brothers for damages to their credit upon
the basis that these items were items not directly involved in construction costs but were caused by appel71
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lants' failure to pay sub-contractors the a1nounts dm
and owing to them at the time they were due and owing.
(d) In addition to the above, adjustment was subsequently made on February 8th, 1955 at the request of
respondent, taking into consideration the payment of
funds to certain painters, not calculated by the tria]
Court or respondent at the time of the signing of the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Said amount
paid to Haycock, et al, was in the amount of $755.52;
one-half of that sum, to wit, $377.76 was deducted from
the judgment rendered by the trial Court, as is disclosed
on Pages 182 and 183 of the Record, "Amendment to
Judgment".
(e) Respondent further submits that the Record
discloses that appellants effected substantial discounts
in Settlements of judgments with certain litigants and
respondent has not been credited for any portion thereof.
1

(f) Respondent submits that the trial Court properly
determined the total income to Harsh Investment Corporation, as set forth in its Findings at R. 192, to be at
least in the amount of $3,339,963.43 and further properly
determined the total amount of construction costs to be
in the amount of $2, 771,685.86, leaving a total construction profit to be divided pursuant to the judgment of
the trial Court, in the amount of $568,177.63.
Respondent still contends an additional amount of
income should be computed under the terms and conditions of the contract of October 4th, 1951, concerning
change order extras as will be set forth in respondent'~
brief on cross appeal.
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Appellants argue in sub-paragraph (b) of their
Point III regarding the caluclation of total expenditures.
In this brief, respondent has set forth by direct quotations from, and reference to, the Record the testimony
substantiating the exp'enditures on the project and again,
here, reiterates that appellants' reference to the Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co. report in the appendix of appellants' brief is improp'er and includes many items not
within the Record of this Court and therefore could not
properly be considered as a proper argument pertaining to this appeal.
Respondent again respectfully submits that appellants had their own controll'er, William Ellis, in Court
during the major portion of the trial between appellants
and respondent and -to now attempt to improperly introduce arguments and testimony pertaining to adjusting
entries subsequent to the taking of testimony in this case
is not proper. Respondent submits that the trial Court
did properly take into consideration all items of construction costs, including the awarding of judgments
to other sub-contractors and litigants before the trial
Court.
CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that the above set forth costs
as determined by the trial Court were proper in each
and every respect and were substantiated by the evidence,
both oral and documentary. Respondent further submits that any attempt by appellants to vary the actual
facts before the Court and contained in the Record by
submitting, as they did in their argument, certain adjustments through the Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
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report, does not conform to the evidence and facts before the trial Court. It does not conform in any way
to the testimony submitted by appellants themselves by
and through th'eir controller, William Ellis, who was
present during the entire trial between respondent and
appellants. It is not supported by the actual books and
records of Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh Investment Corporation which were also before th'e trial Court
and examined by Ellis repeatedly during the course of
the trial.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSTRUED
F.H.A. RULES AND REGULATIONS
Respondent has clearly set forth in his Statement
of Facts, Pages 6 to 10, the matters pertaining to
F .H. A. rules and regulations and the Wherry Housing
Act. To repeat said matters here would take up additional and unnecessary space. Therefore, respondent
makes reference to the matters contained in his Statement of Facts and the documentary evidence therein set
forth supporting his position. In addition thereto, respondent directs this Court's attention to the following:
Appellants' argument in re tire misinterpretation
of the trial Court pertaining to disposition of escrow
funds and the matters therein contained deals directly
with whether or not appellant Harold J. Schnitzer should
be entitled to 10% of th'e amount of the bid and this
matter, together with the matter of Schnitzer's failure
to provide financing, sub-paragraph (b) of appellants'
Point IV, will be discussed in detail as a sub-division
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of respondent's brief on cross appeal and respondent
desires to refer to said section herein by reference in
order to avoid repetition and use of space in this trial
brief.
Pertaining to said escrow fund, appellants, on Pages
89 and 90 of their brief, set forth that these funds
must be paid out by the escrow agent, Irving Trust Co.,
before any amount of the Mortgage is advanced for the
construction of the housing project. However, appellants
fail to point out the other provisions and requirements
of Ex. 3, F .H.A. rules and regulations, the provisions
and requirements of the Com1nitment for Mortgag'e Insurance, the provisions and requirements of the Mortgage, which documents designated these funds as trust
funds to be spent on the construction of the project itself
and not to be returned to Harold J. Schnitzer individually. These matters will be discussed in respondent's
brief on cross appeal.
On Page 92 of their brief, appellants argue that
Locke knew of the financial requirements pertaining to
the construction of the various projects. It is true that
Locke knew the financial requirements as set forth by
various docu:rnents required by F .H.A. Locke knew
that under the various regulations and the terms and
conditions of the contract of October 4th, 1951, that
Schnitzer was required to make the escrow deposits pertaining to the Montana and Utah Projects. During the
entire building of the Hill Air Force Base Housing Project, Locke was engaged in the activities of a general
construction superintendent and was relying upon
Schnitzer to properly finance the project. Locke had
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absolutely no knowledge until during the course of thi~
trial in the Court below how and in what manner Schnitzer had wrongfully and illegally withdrawn funds from
Harsh Investment Corporation and Harsh Utah Corporation and transferred funds from Harsh Construction Company in Montana, which eventually went into
the pocket of Harold J. Schnitzer, in violation of the
agreement of October 4th, 1951 between the parties.
On Page 93 of their brief, appellants make reference
to the testimony of William EHis concerning Ex. 195.
In this connection, respondent desires to refer to Mr.
Ellis' testimony under cross examination wherein he admitted that Ex. 195 disclosled an expenditure by Harsh
Investment Corporation of the sum of $1,040,505.00 on
matters pertaining to projects other than Hill Field Air
Force Base Housing Project and also admitted that this
Ex. 195 disclosed that Harsh Investment Corporation
did not properly receive the required funds from Harsh
Utah Corporation through Irving Trust Co. (T. 475,
1079, 1082-1083, 1088) and further testified that, because
Harold J. Schnitzer had siphoned off funds for his own
personal use, there were insufficient funds with which
to pay Harsh Investment Corporation the amount of
the Construction Contract-"Lump Sum". (T. 1095).
In appellants' arguments that the project was completely
financed they completely ignore and disregard the obligation of Harsh Utah Corporation in its various contracts with Harsh Investment Corporation.
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POINT V.
THE FINDINGS OF FACT SUBSTANTIATE
ADDITIONAL FUNDS DUE LOCKE PERTAINING
TO THE CALIFORNIA PROJECT
During the course of the trial evidence, both oral
and documentary, was introduced pertaining to claims
by respondent Locke for sums due and owing to him
under an agreement with appellant Schnitzer pertaining
to the Barstow, California, Marine Corps Housing Project.
1. The sum of $1500.00 for salary due and owing
to Locke, Ex. 217 (T. 236).
2. The sum of $5000.00 for bonus due and payable
for services rendered on said Barstow Project, Ex. 217,
(T. 956).
3. The sum of $2,178.00 for expens'es due and owing
to Locke, Ex. 217 (T. 145-M, 237).
All of the above mentioned indebtednesses were raised
by the issues before the Court and tried by the Court
by the consent of the parties and without objections by
appellants. The trial Court properly found that the
sum of $8,678.00 was due and owing to respondent Locke,
R. 103, 104.
POINT VI.
SET-OFFS DUE BY RESPONDENT LOCKE TO
APPELLANTS SCHNITZER AND HARSH INVESTMENT CORPORATION WERE PROPERLY
DETERMINED.
During the course of the trial, appellants attempted
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to establish that Locke had embezzled and misappropri
ated c'ertain funds belonging to appellants. This was no
supported by the evidence or the facts in any manne:
whatsoever, as discussed heretofore in this brief. How
ever, during the course of the trial Locke admitted tha
he was indebted to appellants Schniher and Harsh In.
vestment Corporation for certain iten1s, as follows:
1. Promissory note executed by Locke in thE
amount of $11,712.98, together with the sum oJ
$1,000.00 for attorney's fees, as allowed by thE
trial Court, R. 104.
2. The sum of $2,885.93 for certain advance~
made by appellant Schnitzer and/or Harsh In.
vestment Corporation, all of which were admittec
by Locke with the exception of $1200.00 for thE
purchase of a truck load of lumber, R. 105.

CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that all of the findings of the
trial Court are supported by a great preponderance of
the evidence. Respondent further submits that the trial
Court had an opportunity, during the course of the trial,
to view and observe the conduct and attitude of the
witnesses before the trial Court and to determin'e the
truth and veracity of the testimony given by said witness'es. Due to the fact that appellant Harold J. Schnitzer admitted during the course of trial that he did, in
certain instances, commit perjury and due to the fact
that perjury was likewise admitted by Walter E. Hutch·
inson, one of the attorneys for appellants, it is only
reasonable that th'e trial Court should believe the testi·
mony submitted for and on behalf of respondent Oil
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points where it might be in variance with, or different
from, the testimony submitted for and on behalf of appellants. The trial Court, in this matter, should be th'e
exclusive and only judge as to the character and credibility to be given the testimony before that Court.
Respondent has, during the course of this bri'ef,
completely supported all of the statements made in this
brief by references to the transcript and record, both as
to oral and documentary evidence submitted, although
the record is filled with a considerable amount of irrelevant and immaterial matter, due to the leniency of
the Court below in giving appellants every opportunity
to substantiate their claims of fraud and misrepresentation. Nevertheless, the clear, positive evidence supporting respondent's position is contained in the record,
as compared to the complete lack of evidence and testimony to support the theories of appellants.
The position of respondent was, in every respect,
during the course of the trial, substantiated by the testimony of independent witnesses and documentary proof
as against the position of appellants who, at no time
during the course of the trial, produced any testimony
whatsover from a single disinterested and/or independent witness to substantiate their claims and their position. The only defense offered by appellants during the
course of the trial was a malicious attempt to mislead
the Court by the introduction of false testimony and
documents, together with a malicious attempt to confuse the true issues before the Court by allegations of
misappropriation of funds and misconduct on the part of
Locke that was not, in any way whatsoever, substantiated
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by the evidenee, as is properly reflected in the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Court below.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON CROSS APPEAL
STATEMENT OF FACTS ON CROSS APPEAL
During the construction of Hill Field Air Force
Base Housing Project, certain contracts were entered
into between Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh Investment Corporation for change order extras, Exs. 164
and 196. The contract amount of the approved change
orders between Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh Investment Corporation was in the amount of $333,952.55.
In determining the amount of the additional income to
Harsh Investment Corporation the trial Court determined the amount of additional income to Harsh Investment Corporation to be the amount testified to during
the course of the trial as $178,672.00 which was the
amount of additional mortgage proceeds to be received
by Harsh Utah Corporation. Respondent submits that
by the great weight of authority and the testimony offered during the course of the trial the additional mortgage ben'efits received by Harsh Utah Corporation did
not, in any way, control the amount of the contract between Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh Investment
Corporation.
The trial Court should have determined the increase
to which Harsh Investment Corporation was 'entitled,
over and above the amount of the Construction Contract
-"Lump Sum", to be the sum of $333,952.55, which was
the amount contained on the face of the change orders
and under the terms and conditions of the Construction
Contract-"Lump Sum" and Articl'e 15 of the specifi80
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cations that should have been added on to the Construction Contract-"Lump Sum" of $2,995,205.00 in computing the bonus due Locke under the terms and conditions
of the contract of October 4th, 1951.
Under the terms and conditions of the October 4th,
1951 agreement between Locke and Schnitzer, Schnitzer
and/ or Harsh was to retain a sum of money equal to
10% of the amount of the bid made by Harsh and accepted by the Government which, pertaining to the Hill
Field Air Force Base Housing Project, would be th'e
sum of $276,700.00. This provision in the contract between the parties was placed in the contract to compensate Schnitzer for providing the needed capital for th'e
construction of said project and to provide a means of
returning to him the sum of $276,700.00. On July 21st,
1952, Schnitzer did provide, from funds borrowed from
his father-in-law and the First National Bank of Portland, Oregon, the sum of $611,200.00. By the terms and
conditions of the F.H.A. rules and regulations, Ex. 3,
the Financial Requirements for Closing, Ex. 188, the
Commitment for Mortgage Insurance, Ex. 186, and by a
great preponderance of the testimony during the course
of the trial, even from appellants' own witness, Walter
E. Hutchinson, secretary of Harsh Utah Corporation,
these funds were to remain on deposit during the entire construction period to insure that sufficient funds
would be available to comptetely finance the construction
of the Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Project. A
certain portion of said funds was also required, under
the F.H.A. rules and regulations, to establish the equity
of Harsh Utah Corporation over and above the amount
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of tlre mortgage proceeds. The resolution of Harsh
Utah Corporation passed by the Board of Directors on
July 21st, 1952 at the time said deposit was n1ade with
the mortgagee, provides as follows:
"RESOLVED: That since Harsh Utah Corporation has received the benefits accruing from the
advances of $624,994.00 to the corporation that
the offer of Mr. Schnitzer to forego demand for
reimbursement of said sum on the understanding
that the corporation would accept such sum as
contributed surplus is hereby accepted.
The
books of the corporation shall b'e set up in a
manner to reflect the fact that Mr. Schnitzer has
contributed the sum of $624,994.00 as contributed
surplus". Page 13, Ex. 161.
Contrary to the terms of this resolution, Schnitzer did
not forego demand for reimbursement and contrary to
the F.H.A. rul'es and regulations, the Commitment for
Mortgage Insurance, the Building and Loan Agreement
and the Mortgage, as well as in violation of the agreement of October 4th, 1951, Schnitzer withdrew a total
of $631,000.00 from Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh
Investment Corporation between November 5th, 1952
and March 24th, 1953. T. 1094-1095; 143-146; 163-168).
The funds withdrawn by Schnitzer were $19,800.00 in
excess of any funds originally provided by Schnitzer.
Prior to the execution of the agreement of October
4th, 1951, Schnitzer induced Locke to give up hls 50%
joint venture in the ownership of the Wherry Housing
Projects as set forth in respondent's brief in order to
·enable Schnitzer to raise additional funds with which
to finance said projects by selling stock in the owner82
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ship corporations. After the agreement of October 4th,
1951 was signed by Locke, Schnitzer did not sell any of
the stock but retained all of said stock himself and in
violation of the agreement of October 4th, 1951, did not
leave the funds on deposit as contemplated by the
parties.
STATEMENT OF POINTS ON CROSS APPEAL
POINT I.
THE AMOUNT OF THE CHANGE ORDER
EXTRAS SHOULD HAVE BEEN IN THE
SUM OF $333,952.55 INSTEAD OF $178,672.00.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE
ALLOWED APPE:LLANTS TO RECEIVE 10%
OF THE AMOUNT OF THE BID, TO WIT,
$276,700.00 BEFORE DETERMINING THE
AMOUNT OF BONUS RESPONDENT LOCKE
WAS ENTITLED TO.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE AMOUNT OF THE CHANGE ORDER
EXTRAS SHOULD HAVE BEEN IN THE
SUM OF $333,952.55 INSTEAD OF $178,672.00.
The change orders were supplemental contracts between Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh Investm'ent
Corporation as builder. According to the terms and
conditions of the Construction Contract-"Lump Sum",
Ex. 61, contractor is entitled to extras for change orders
in accordance with the specifications, Ex. 1.
Article XV of the specifications reads, in part, as
follows:
"Art. XV-Changes in the Work: The owner,
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without invalidating the contract, may order
extra work, or make changes by altering, adding to
or deducting from the work, the contract sum
being adjusted accordingly ... the value of any
such extra work on changes shall be determined in
one or more of the following ways:
(a) By estimate and acceptanc'e in a lump sum;
(b) By unit prices named in the contract or
subsequ'ently agreed upon;
(c) By cost and percentage or by cost and
fixed fee".
During the course of construction Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh Investment Corporation executed change
orders 1 through 79 pertaining to the construction of the
Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Project, Exs. 164 and
196. These change orders were signed by both Harsh
Utah Corporation as owner and mortgagor and by Harsh
Investment Corporation as contractor. The procedure
followed was, as set forth in (a) above, by estimate and
acc'eptance in a lump sum (T. 347-350, 1123-1125 ). See
also appendix, Pages 23 to 29.
Respondent submits that the terminology of the
change orders themselves constitute binding contracts between the two corporations. The terminology on th·e face
of each change order, Exs. 164 and 196, is as follows:
"Contractor, mortgagor and mortgagee indicate
by signing this request that: It is the expressed
intention to execute the changes described herein; it is understood that FHA acceptance will
be determined without regard to cost and in no
way implies acceptance of or compliance with
mortgagor's statement of cost; it is also understood that when F.H.A. has estimated and summarized the costs of all accepted changes and the
84
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net effect thereof is a decrease in the total construction cost, the insurable amount may be
similarly decreased but if the net effect is an increase above the mortgage amount the additional
costs will be defrayed by the mortgagor."
The procedure followed pertaining to these change
orders was as follows: The change orders were instituted by the mortgagor, the owner, Harsh Utah Corporation, setting forth the desired changes requested and
the amount of money that the mortgagor would pay to
the contractor, Harsh Investment Corporation, to 'execute these changes. The change orders were then submitted to F.H.A. for two purposes: First, to obtain the
approval of the Inspection Division of F.H.A. to change
the plans and specifications to incorporate the changes
requested irrrespective of any monetary consideration
thereof. Secondly, for F.H.A. to then make an appraisal for the purposes of submitting figures to the
mortgagee, Irving Trust Co., stating, in 'effect, that in
the event that the change orders outlined on the request were performed that the insurable mortgage on
the Hill Fi'eld Air Force Base Housing Project could
be increased by so many dollars. See appendix, Pages
23 to 29.
Many of the change orders submitted by Harsh Utah
Corporation and Harsh Investment Corporation were
approved by the F.H.A. and incorporated in a change
in the original plans and specifications for the construction of Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Project.
The total monetary value submitted on the approved
changes by Harsh Utah Corporation indicated that the
increased costs of Harsh Investment Corporation as
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the builder in executing these change orders would be in
the amount of $333,952.55 (T. 298-303, 434-435). See
appendix, Pages 30 to 32. Under the terms and conditions of the change orders themselves-"IF THE NE'l,
EFFECT IS AN INCREASE ABOVE THE MORTGAGE AMOUNT THE ADDITIONAL COSTS WILL
BE DE,FRAYED BY THE MORTGAGOR", respondent submits that Harsh Utah Corporation would be
obligated to pay to Harsh Investment Corporation the
sum of $333,952.55.
Harsh Utah Corporation did receive an increase in
its F .H.A. insured mortgage, according to the testimony
at the time of trial, in the sum of $178,672.00 which the
trial Court computed in its Findings of Fact as an increase in the construction contract. However, respond'ent submits that by the terms and conditions of the
Construction Contract-"Lump Sum", and the specifications, the amount of the increase that should have
been computed that Harsh Utah Corporation was to
pay to Harsh Investment Corporation was in the amount
of $333,952.55, in computing the bonus due Locke pursuant to the agreement of Octob'er 4th, 1951.
It is utterly absurd to suppose that in executing the
agreement of October 4th the parties intended that
the "Lump Sum" construction contractor would be required to do any "extra" work at the owner's request
for only 90% of cost (the mortgage figure) if F.H.A.
approved, and for nothing if F. H. A. disapproved the
change for mortgage purposes.
Such an arrangement would have empowered
Schnitzer to double the size of the project without any
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increase in the contract price as a "change order" and
thus insure that no construction profit would be realized.
Tirey must have intended the usual and customary
arrangements between owner and builder whereby construction "contract sum" would be adjusted according
to the increase in work performed. And that was what the
construction contract, executed by Schnitzer himself,
did provide.
The amount of income for change order extras
should have been $333,952.55, the contract price therefor.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE
ALLOWED APPELLANTS TO RECEIVE 10%
OF THE AMOUNT OF THEr BID.
Appellants should not have recived 10% of th'e
amount of the bid inasmuch as there was a total failure
of consideration, and that special "finance fee" was
never earned. Under the terms and conditions of
the October 4th, 1951 agreement, Harsh was to retain
a sum of money equal to 10% of th'e total amount of
the bid made by Harsh and accepted by the Government.
There apparently is no dispute that this provision was
placed in the contract as compensation to Harsh and/or
Schnitzer in exchange for the obligation of Schnitz'er to
provide certain capital required for the construction of
the Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Project. See
appellant's brief, p. 65, where it is declared (correctly)
that the parties knew that all money and credit would
The
have to be furnished by Schnitzer personally.
testimony of both Schnitzer and Locke was that whereas
Locke had a 50% joint venture ownership interest
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in contracts executed prior to the October 4th, 1951
agreement, Exs. 157 and 158, Locke gave up his ownership interest becaus'e of representations made by Harold
J. Schnitzer that he would be required to dispose of
capital stock of the ownership corporation in order to
finance more than one project. (T. 32M, 33M, 411\f, 7779).
Contrary to Schnitzer's representations to Locke
that he had to dispose of stock in the corporation,
Schnitzer did not dispose of any of the stock nor did he
invest any of his own funds whatsoever for a stock
interest in any of the three Wherry Housing Proj'ects.
Walter E. Hutchinson, Secretary of Harsh Utah Corporation testified (T. 824) that Schnitzer had not paid
5c for a stock interest in any of his corporations pertaining to the owning and construction of the Wherry
Housing Projects. Respondent submits that from the
testimony of appellant Schnitzer himself, he expected a
return of the funds deposited in escrow by himself for
the benefit of Harsh Utah Corporation through the provisions in th'e October 4th, 1951 agreement returning to
Schnitzer and/or Harsh 10% of the bid. This intent
is expressed in his testimony ( T. 861) as follows: "And
I determined at that time that the amount which I felt
was the minimum sum which would be necessary for me
to undertake this typ'e of operation with Mr. Locke
entire project of the first profits. The first $150,000.00
would have to be turned to me before our 10% of our
would be a return to me first from all profits of the
bid would first have to be return'ed to me before a division between myself and Mr. Locke". It is submitted
that this language clearly indicates the method and
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manner the funds were to be return'ed to Schnitzer that
he had advanced. However, the testimony clearly shows,
as set forth herein, that he not only received a return
of all of the funds advanced by himself within a short
period of time but, in fact, received some $19,800.00 in
excess thereof.
Under the F.H.A. rules and regulations, Schnitzer
was required to furnish certain funds to Harsh Utah
Corporation to provide an escrow amount to insure the
adequate financing and completion of the Hill Field Air
Force Base Housing Project, Exs. 3 and 188. According
to the terms and conditions of the Building and Loan
Agreement, Ex. 64, these funds were to be treated as
trust funds and were to be used for payment of expenses
over and above the mortgage in the construction of Hill
Field Air Force Base Housing Project. Inasmuch as
thes'e requirements were set forth in Ex. 3 it is apparent
that both Locke and Schnitzer knew of these requirements prior to the October 4th, 1951 agreement and the
provision in that agreement allowing Harsh to retain
10% of the total amount of th'e bid before computing
the bonus to which Locke would be entitled, was unquestionably the means by which Schnitzer was to be
compensated for providing the capital necessary, which
should have been retain'ed in the project at Hill Field
in the total amount of $620,000.00 and a similar amount
pertaining to the Great Falls Montana Air Force Base
Housing Project.
Pertaining to the Hill Field Air Force Base Housing
Project, Schnitzer did provide a total of $611,200.00 for
a short period of tim'e. The sources of these funds, ac89
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cording to the testimony, are as follows :
$14,200.00 from his own personal account.
$97,000.00 borrowed from Harsh Construction
Company, which funds were likewise trust funds
pertaining to the Great Falls Air Force Base
Housing Project.
$100,000.00 borrowed from Jennings Furniture
Company, a company owned by his fath'er-in-law.
$100,000.00 borrowed from Metropolitan Stores,
likewise owned by his father-in-law.
$300,000.00 borrowed from the First National
Bank of Portland, Oregon.
These funds were obtained in July of 1952 (T. 140-142).
On July 21st, 1952, Harsh Utah Corporation held a
meeting of its Board of Directors in Salt Lake City,
Utah. This was the date that the "formal closing" of
all F .H.A. requirements and the formal execution of
certain documents pertaining to Hill Field Air Force
Base Housing Project took place. In order to meet
these requirements the Board of Directors of Harsh
Utah Corporation submitted the following Minutes and
Resolution pertaining to the above mentioned funds
supplied by Harold J. Schnitz'er, Ex. 161 at Page 13:
MINUTES OF SPECIAL MEETING OF DIRECTORS
OF
HARSH UTAH CORPORATION
A special meeting of the Board of Directors of the
Harsh Utah Corporation was held at Judge Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah, on July 21st, 1952, at 4:00 P. M.
The meeting was called to order by the President, Mr.
Harold J. Schnitzer, and Minutes of such m'eeting were
reported by the Secretary, Mr. Walter E. Hutchinson.
The President stated that all directors had in writ-
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ing waived notice of such meeting and directed that such
waiver b'e attached to the Minutes of the meeting.
Mr. Schnitzer then stated that the purpose of the
meeting was to discuss the compliance of FHA financial
requirements for closing of loan previously authorized
by the Board of Directors. He reported that he had
advanced in behalf of the Corporation in connection
with the housing project undertaken the amount of the
FHA application and commitment fee; that he had deposited $25,000.00 with tll'e U. S. Air Force as a security
deposit to assure that construction of the project would
corrunence.
Mr. Schnitzer then stated that prior to the closing
of the loan it was necessary that the Corporation deposit
with the Irving Trust Company the sum of $39,552.00
as working capital to assure that there would be funds
to pay certain pre-opening expenses, the purpose of such
deposit being to take care of expenses in those cases
where the rental income was not sufficient to pay such
expenses, and it was further required at the time of
closing that the Corporation deposit with Irving Trust
Company the difference between the cost of the proj'ect,
as estimated by the FHA, and the amount of the mortgage loan, which difference was in the sum of $585,442.00.
Mr. Schnitzer th'en stated that since the Corporation
was required to raise the amounts stated prior to closing and as he was the owner of the outstanding stock
of the Corporation except for the qualifying shares as
required under the laws of Utah, he had, in order to
assure the completion of the project and the success of
the Corporation, advanced such sum to the Corporation
on the understanding that such sums would be accepted
by the Corporation as an additional contribution to surplus, notwithstanding the fact that in his opinion the
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construction of th'e project could be accomplished for a
sum less than that estimated by the FHA.
After some discussion, the directors, being of the
unanimous opinion that such an arrangement would
meet th'e requirements of the FHA and be of benefit
to the Corporation, presented the following resolution:
RESOLVED: That since Harsh Utah Corporation
has received the benefits accruing froin the advance of $624,994.00 to the corporation that the
offer of Mr. Schnitzer to forego demand for reimbursement of said sum on the understanding that
the corporation would accept such sum as contributed surplus is hereby accepted. The books
of the corporation shall be set up in such manner
as to reflect the fact that Mr. Schnitzer has contributed the sum of $624,994.00 as contributed
surplus.
HAROLD J. SCHNITZER
WALTER E. HUTCHINSON
President
Secretary
It should be noted that this meeting was held and
this resolution adopted at the same time that the funds
were contributed to the surplus of Harsh Utah Corporation.
It is also pertinent to note that when Schnitzer
withdrew this contributed surplus, as hereinafter more
particularly s'et out, he not only violated his contract
with Locke, and the F.H.A. regulations, but he also
violated the laws of Utah. Under the Utah Code it was
and is unlawful to pay any corporate dividend except
out of the "surplus profits arising from the business of
the corporation," or to withdraw or pay to any stock92
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holder any part of the assets of the corporation 'except
as provided by statutory law.
Sections 16-2-15 and 76-13-4, subsections (1) and
(2), U.C.A. 1953;
Pace v. Pace Bros. Co. 91 Utah 149, 63 P 2d
590.
Attention is directed to the obvious language of the
above set forth resolution, uthe offer of Mr. Schnitzer to
forego dema;nd for reimbursement of said sum"
($624,994.00). It is very apparent that Schnitzer knew
from the language of the above set forth resolution that
lie could not lawfully, under the provisions of his agreement with Locke, withdraw any of said funds for his
own personal use and benefit.
During the course of the trial in the Court below,
when respondent pressed Schnitzer and Ellis, over
violent objections from Schnitzer's counsel, to account
for said funds, it was disclosed that between November
5th, 1952 and March 24th, 1953, Schnitzer had withdrawn
from Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh Investment
Corporation a total of $631,000.00. (T. 163-168), as
follows:
November 5th, 1952, $4,000.00 from Harsh Investment Corporation.
Novemb'er 15th, 1952, $250,000.00 from Harsh
Utah Corporation.
November 17th, 1952, $3,000.00 from Harsh Investment Corporation.
November 24th, 1952, $50,000.00 from Harsh Utah
Corporation.
February 25th, 1953, $220,000.00 from Harsh
Utah Corporation.
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March 24th, 1953, $104,000.00 fron1 Harsh Utah
Corporation.
Total, $631,000.00. (T. 163-168)
This fact was not known to Locke until this testimony
was elicited during the course of the trial.
Schnitzer knew that by withdrawing these funds
he was in direct violation of his agre'ement with Locke
and when it appeared, early in the trial, that this fact
was going to be brought before the Court below, he
hurriedly, with the assistance of Walter E. Hutchinson,
one of his attorneys from Portland, Oregon, prepared
a false and fraudulent purported corporate resolution
in an attempt to veil his unlawful withdrawals with corporate authority. In introducing the purported minutes
and resolution authorizing the withdrawal, both Schnitzer and Hutchinson testified that the minutes and resolution were prepared in Portland, Oregon, on or about
April 1st, 1953 in the office of Walter E. I-Iutchinson.
When presented to the trial Court the purported minutes
and resolution were neatly enclosed within the Minute
Book of Harsh Utah Corporation, Ex. 161, at Page 17.
The testimony from Hutchinson and Schnitzer pertaining to this document was presented to the trial Court
on June lOth, 1954.
After this document had been presented, respondent's attorney, John M. Sherman, compared this document with a document filed by Mr. King the day before,
June 9th, 1954, entitled "Demand For Production of
Documents", R. 31 and 32 which was obviously prepared
in his office and engaged the services of J. Percy Goddard of Salt Lake City as an expert to compare said
94
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documents. Mr. Goddard, with the assistance of a
photographer, William Hollis Shipler, identified the
above mentioned two documents as having been prepared
on the same typewriter. (T. 213-M- 232-M, Ex. 229).
The introduction of the above mentioned exp'ert
testimony identifying the typewriter upon which the purported resolution was written and the testimony of
Donald H. Terry, an investigator engaged by respondent's attorney, (T. 656-722), forced Schnitzer and Hutchinson to return to the witness stand on June 21st,
1954 and admit that they had given false, fraudulent
testimony pertaining to said corporate resolution. The
resolution herein referred to and the minutes pertaining thereto are set forth as follows:
MINUTES OF SPECIAL MEETING OF DIRECTORS
OF
HARSH UTAH CORPORATION
A special meeting of the Board of Directors of
Harsh Utah Corporation was held at the offices of the
corporation in Portland, Oregon, on April 1, 1953, at
3:00 o'clock P.M. The meeting was called to order by
the President, Mr. Harold J. Schnitzer, and minutes of
such meeting were recorded by the Secretary, Mr. Walter
E. Hutchinson.
The President stated that all directors had in writing waived notice of said meeting and directed that said
waiver be attached to the minutes of the meeting.
Mr. Schnitzer then stated that the purpose of the
meeting was to discuss the return of $624,994.00 which
Mr. Schnitzer had contributed to the capital surplus of
the corporation on July 21, 1952, in order to assist this
corporation in its compliance with requirements of the
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Federal Housing Administration in the closing of its
insured mortgage loan.
Mr. Schnitzer then stated that in his opinion the
purpose for which said contribution to the capital surplus had been made were now consumated and that it
was no longer necessary that the corporation retain said
contribution.
After some discussion, the directors being of the
unanimous opinion that it was no longer necessary that
the corporation retain said capital contribution, the
corporation adopted the following resolution:
RESOLVED, that since Harsh Utah Corporation
has received the benefits accruing from the advance of $624,994.00 to the corporation and that
it is no longer essential to the business of the
corporation that it continue to retain said contribution, that the said capital contribution of
$624,994.00 be returned to Mr. Schnitzer at this
time, and that the books of the corporation be set
up in such manner as to reflect the return of said
contribution to the capital surplus of this corporation.
HAROLD J. SCHNITZER
WALTER E. HUTCHINSON
President
Secretary
It is interesting to note the ridiculous and inconsistent means to which Schnitzer and his attorneys resorted in their attempt to defraud Locke out of his
legitimate claims. This purported corporate resolution
is diametrically opposed to the earlier corporate resolution of July 21st, 1952 of Harsh Utah Corporation pertaining to the deposit of said funds wherein Schnitzer
offered to forego any demand for reimbursement.
In their anxiety to vindicate Schnitzer's illegal with96
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drawal of the above mentioned $631,000.00 Schnitzer,
and Hutchinson hastily prepared a corporate resolution pertaining thereto which is without any legal
force or eff'ect whatsoever nor it is capable of intelligent
interpretation. Respondent's attorneys are still unable,
even as of the writing of this brief, to understand the
meaning of said resolution. It provides that $624,994.00
be return'ed to Schnitzer and it also provides that the
books of the corporation be adjusted "to reflect the
return of said contribution to capital surplus of this
corporation". Even in his greatest day, Houdini would
have failed in this endeavor.
It is also interesting to note that the means employed by Schnitzer and his counsel in their attempt to
defraud Locke were not only inconsistent within the
minutes and resolutions of Harsh Utah Corporation
themselves but th'ey are, as well, illegal, unlawful and
ridiculous. Perhaps the factor that greatly assisted in
this futile drama was the personnel of the Board of Directors of Harsh Utah Coproration itself, Harold J.
Schnitzer, his wife, Arlene Schnitzer and his co-conspirator and co-defendant, Walter E. Hutchinson. In
fairness respondents' attorneys desire to comment that
in examining Ex. 161, the Minute Book of Harsh Utah
Corporation the signature of Arlene Schnitzer is conspicuous by its absence from any corporate resolution
or minutes therein contained and from any waiver of
notice of any meeting purportedly held.

According to the testimony as finally disclosed to
the trial Court, this resolution was prepared between
9 :00 A. M. and 9 :40 A. M. in Salt Lake City the morning
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it was introduced into evidenc'e before the trial Court,
June lOth, 1954. (T. 656-722).
The above set forth purported resolution is further
inconsistent in that it recites a return of funds to Schnitzer totalling $624,994.00 whereas in truth and in fact
he had already withdrawn $631,000.00. The greater
portion of this sum had been withdrawn in the month of
November, 1952 and all of said withdrawals were made
without the benefit of any resolution whatsoever.
It is further submitted that the sourC'e of the funds
were trust funds under the Building and Loan Agreement to be used to pay for the costs of constructing the
Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Project; that said
funds were withdrawn from tire Irving Trust Co. on
requisitions for funds, Ex. 141, which contained on each
the signature of Harold J. Schnitzer certifying that the
funds would be used for the purpose of paying for the
actual expenses of construction of the project. The only
possible way that Harsh Utah Corporation could obtain F. H. A. insurance on said mortgage advances was
on the basis of the certifications made in Ex. 141.
Respondent Locke had knowledge of and relied upon
th'e requirements of the Harsh Utah Corporation resolution of July 21st, 1952, wherein "the offer of Mr.
Schnitzer to forego demand for reimbursement of said
sum" was made. Locke further knew of the terminology
and requirements of the docum'ents contained in Ex. 141,
Requisition for Funds, and in good faith had expected
Schnitzer to abide by the above mentioned requirements
when he entered into the agreement of October 4th, 1951,
tire terms of which provided for a return of 10% of the
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amount of the bid to Schnitzer.
The testimony and record further reveals that appellant Schnitzer did not, at any time, have any cash invested in any of the corporations pertaining to the
Wherry Housing Projects and without the permanent
investment of any funds, acquired an ownership interest
for the duration of a 75-year lease that provides him
with a tax-free income of approximately $100,000.00 P'er
year. (T. 90-M, 91-M).
As a direct result of the withdrawal of the above
mentioned funds, Harsh Utah Corporation did not have
sufficient funds with which to pay Harsh Investment
Corporation the amount of the Construction Contract "Lump Sum" or the amount of the change order extras.
(T. 829, 1095, 1120-1122, 1151, 1164).
The testimony reveals that in addition to the proceeds of the mortgage the sum of $620,000.00 capital
required of Schnitzer would be the funds available for
the construction of the Hill Fi:eld Air Force Base Housini Project. (T. 1115, 829-830, 987-992), see appendix
Pages 15-21, 34-37, and there appears to be no doubt
that at the time of entering into the agreement of October 4th, 1951, app'ellant Schnitzer knew that these funds
were to be trust funds that would remain on deposit at
least until the completion of the project and that a substantial portion thereof would amount to a permanent
investment in exchange for acquiring the own'ership
interest in the leasehold improvements. Locke relied
on Schnitzer to perform this part of the agreem'ent
when he relinquished his ownership interest and signed
the October 4th, 1951 agreement.
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The trial court after a careful consideration of th(
record and of the reliability of the several witnesse~
found as a fact that it was the intent of the parties i11
entering into the contract of October 4, 1951, tha1
Schnitzer and/or Harsh would provide all necessar~
financing in accordance with F. H. A. regulations
and the requirements of the mortgagee, but that
in fact neither of them did so and that such failure
was a material breach of the contract with Locke (R 9697 ; Findings 13 to 15).
These and the other findings of the trial court are
supported by the evidence received at the trial, and
under Utah law will not be disturbed by this court unless it clearly appears that they are against the manifest
weight of the evidence, which is not the case, as the
findings are clearly supported by the record.
This doctrine is so firmly established by a multitude
of cases that no citation should be needed. However,
for the convenience of the court we append citations to
a few of the decisions establishing this doctrine :
McKay v. Farr
15 Utah 261, 49 Pac. 649 ;
Elliott v. Whitmore
23 Utah 462, 65 Pac. 70;
Sidney Stevens Implement Company v. South
Ogden Land Building and Improvement Company
20 Utah 267, 58 Pac. 843;
Hansen vs. Mutual Finance Corporation, 84 Utah
579, 37 p 2d 782;
Wilcox v. Cloward
88 Utah 503, 56 P 2d 1;
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Shaw v. Jeppson
Utah , 239 P 2d 745;
Lawlor v. Lawlor
Utah , 240 P 2d 271.
The trial court, however, furtlrer found that this
breach did not damage Locke other than by increasing
awards to sub-contractors for their damages and costs,
which were eliminated in computing Locke's bonus, and
then concluded (as a finding) that Schnitzer therefore
had not lost his right to retain 10% of the amount of
his bid. In reaching this conclusion the trial court misapprehended and failed to apply the legal theory on
which this issue was submitted to the court, and consequently,it is submitted, fell into inadvertent error of
law.
Recovery of damages for breach of contract is not
respondent's theory on this issue. This issue was and
is submitted on respondent's theory that Schnitzer had
no right to this 10% "financing fee" because he never
earned it-because he never performed the financing
service which, under the contract, was the consideration
for and the condition precedent to his right to exclude
this 10% in computing Locke's share of construction
profits.
It should also be noted that Locke does not se·ek
to recover the entire amount of 10% of the bid. He
seeks only to have this "financing expense" disallowed
as a cost in computing his bonus, just as a claimed expense for material or equipment which was never furnished would be disallowed as a cost in computing the
construction profit and the bonus.
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To illustrate, suppose that on the accounting
Schnitzer had claimed credit in the sum of $250,000 as
rental for construction equipment alleged to have been
leased by him for use on the project, but the proof
showed that no such equipment had ever been furnished
by him or used by the contractor on the project. It is
clear that such claim would have to be disallowed, and
that Schnitzer would never be permitted to pay himself
$250,000 for equipment never actually furnished or used,
even though he had a contract under which he might
have earned that rental if he had furnished the equipment.
Similarly Schnitzer cannot be allowed to pay himself $276,700.00 as a charge or fee for financing which
he never furnished.
Let us consider once more, briefly, the background
and the contract of the parti'es. Prior to the October
4th agreement Locke owned a joint interest in the entire
project, both ownership and construction. Locke was
induced to give up his ownership interest by Schnitz'er's
representations that Schnitzer could not perform his
obligation to finance the entire project, as contemplated
by the parties and required by law, unless Locke released his interest in the owning company stock so
that the stock could be pledged or sold by Schnitzer.
But Schnitzer agreed that Locke was to have, instead,
a one-half interest, by way of bonus , in "the net profit
earned by Harsh in connection with the construction of
the aforesaid projects." The net construction profit
obviously was intended to be computed by subtracting
from the gross construction income the total of the
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proper allowable construction costs and ·expenses-but
here Schnitzer and his advisors insisted on one notable
addition. The contract drawn by them provided in effect that Schnitzer's "finance fee" of 10% of the bid
(or $276,700) should be considered and deducted as if
it were a construction cost, which it was not. This, as
the court properly found, was in consideration of Schnitzer's undertaking properly to finance the entire project,
both construction and ownership. This "financing fee'
was to be retain'ed by Harsh, Schnitzer's wholly owned
corporation-doubtless for the purpose of saving the
increased income taxes which would have become due
if this finance fee had been paid to Schnitzer p'ersonally
by either the owner corporation or the contractor corporation.
It must be remembered that all these contracts were
drawn by Schnitz'er or his own attorneys, and so under
familiar rules must be construed most strictly against
him.

But, as the court found, neither Schnitzer nor any
of his corporations ever performed this obligation to
finance the project-he never delivered th'e "quid pro
quo" for which his corporation was to be allowed to
charge and retain a "financing fee" of $276,700 against
the construction profit as if it were a construction cost
(which it was not). Having failed to pay the agr'eed
"quid pro quo" for this profitable privilege, neither
Schnizter nor his corporation are entitled, in law or in
equity, or in good conscience, to retain and use in this
suit the right and privilege or the mon·eys for which the
consideration has failed by reason of their own meretricious default.
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The contract of October 4th is obviously divisible
under the evidence, the findings of tlre court, and the
law. The principal agreement is that Locke is to receive a monthly salary plus a bonus of 50% of the construction profits in return for his assistance in biddinig
the project and acting as superintendent of construction.
The other, and severable agreement was that Schnitzer
is to be paid a financing fee of 10% of the Government
bid or $276,700, out of the first construction profits as
consideration for his financing of the entire project. But
as he did not finance the project, he has not earned his
financing fee, and should not be allowed to retain the
same and charge it against the construction profits, any
more than he should be permitted to retain purported
fees for equipment rental on equipment never actually
furnished.
By reason of his default the second, and severabl'e,
clause or agreement in the contract has failed and is
unenforceable, leaving only the principal agreem'ent for
Locke's bonus of 50% in force and good standing before the court. The agreement for a bonus, which Locke
has fully performed, can and should b'e enforced without
reference to or consideration of the severable agreement for the retention of a financing fee which was
n'ever earned. If the unearned financing fee is disallowed, that automatically increases the agreed construction profits by the amount of the fee, and Locke was
and is entitled to a judgment for one-half of the construction profits computed without first deducting that
unearn'ed finance fee. In failing to grant such judgment the trial court (through misapprehension of the
theory on which the matter was finally submitted, as
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respondent believes) fell into error.
That the contract was divisible on th·e basis above
outlined seems abundantly clear from the record and
the law. The fact that the balance of the contract was
actually performed without Schnitzer furnishing the
agreed financing is itself conclusive evidence that the
contract is one which in its nature and purpose is
susceptible of division and apportionment. The project
could be and was built without personal financing by
Schnitzer. Harsh Utah could have borrowed against
its anticipated rentals in order to pay construction costs
over the amount of the mortgage. Even now it appears
that the balance due the contractor on the lump-sum
contract and the "change order extras" will have to be
paid out of these rentals. Moreover, as the court found,
the parties th'emselves allocated the 10% as consideration for Schnitzer's financing, separate and apart from
the other portion of their agreements.
Under these circumstances, it is submitted, the
agreement for a finance fee to be paid to Schnitzer is
severable from the principal contract under the rules
announced in
17 CJS "Contracts", Sections 331 to 334, and cases
cited.
Moreover, it is a familiar rule that in actions on
severable contracts a partial failure of consideration is
a defense pro tanto.
17 CJS "Contracts", Section 130, Note 49.
The same rule certainly should apply when, as here,
on an accounting one party (Schnitzer) claims credit
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for an item the consideration for which has failed.
Locke is also entitled to recover one-half of tlH
amount of this forfeited "finance fee' under the equitable
principles of quasi-contracts.
Gen'erally a right quasi contractu arises out of "un.
just enrichment" of one party at the expense of another:

"A person unjustly enriched at the expense
of another is required to make restitution to the
other."
Restatement of the Law:
Restitution, Section 1.
However, there are cases in which the right of
action ex quasi contractu arises 'even though the unjust
enrichment is not at the expense of the plaintiff. As
the Restatement says,
"In other situations, a benefit has been received by the defendant but the plaintiff has not
suffered a corresponding loss or, in some cases
any loss, but nevertheless, the enrichment of the
defendant would be unjust. In such cases the
def'endant may be under a duty to give to the
plaintiff the amount by which he has been enriched. Thus where a person with knowledge
of the facts wrongfully disposes of the property
of another and makes a profit thereby, he is
accountable for the profit and not merely for
the value of the property of the other with which
he wrongfully dealt (see §151)."
Restatem'ent of the Law:
Restitution §1, comment e.
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These principles are, of course, recognized in Utah.
Baugh v. Darby
112 u. 1, 184 p. 2d 335.
The basis for these rights is essentially equitable,
even though the common law afforded a remedy. An
excellent case outlining the basis and history of the
right and the remedy was handed down by the Supreme
Court of Ohio in 1938. It is
Hummel v. Hummel
14 N.E. 2d 923.
In that case a parent, who had paid all the pr'emiums
on an insurance policy on his son, recovered from his
son in quasi contract all of the proceeds of cashing the
policy, even though they exceeded the amount he had
paid out in premiums. This case arose out of an oral
agreement between them which the father could not
enforce because of the statute of frauds. The Ohio Court
refused to permit the son to 'enrich himself by refusing
to recognize his obligation, even though that obligation
was based only on morals and was not legally enforceable.
The case at bar is even stronger, for here th'ere is
nothing illegal or void about Schnitzer's undertaking
to provide all required financing for the Housing Projects. This is an 'equitable case, and equity, morals,
and good conscienC'e all join in requiring that Schnitzer
be not allowed to profit by his own wrong in wilfully
breaching his contract and then falsifying records with
the obvious purpose and intent of cheating and defrauding Locke out of his just dues. He cannot in
equity be permitted to take from the common construct-
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ion fund moneys he, in violation of his agreement, never
earned. It is obvious from the contract and the record
that Schnitzer was not intended to have this "financing
fee" unless and until he had adequately and properly
financed the project, and this he has never done-instead he has bent every effort to cheat Locke out of
his share. It would be most unjust to permit him to
enrich himself with all of this "finance fee" when he
has not performed the conditions which were prescribed
as the consideration therefor.
The most that equity and good conscience could
permit Schnitzer to retain on a quantum meruit basis
in view of this failure to 'earn the finance fee as contemplated, would be legal interest at 6% on the amounts
actually advanced during the few short months they
were held by Harsh Utah Corporation and Irving Trust
Company as escrow holder.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that this Court should
increase the amount of the judgment in favor of respondent by making a determination that under the
terms and conditions of the agreement of October 4th,
1951, between respondent and appellants, that the
change orders between Harsh Utah Corporation and
Harsh Investment Corporation should be computed to
be $333,952.55. That in addition thereto, this Court
should determine that appellants Schnitzer andjor
Harsh should not be entitled to retain 10% of the
amount of the bid as a "finance fee" because the same
was not earned, and the consideration therefor has
failed and was n'ever delivered as agreed, and because
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it would be inequitable and unjust to allow him to enrich
himself at Locke's expense without performing his part
of the bargain.
Respondent submits that this Court should amend
the trial Court's decision and increase the Judgment
in favor of respondent by one-half of the amounts set
forth below:
One-half of $276,700.00 ________________________________ $138,350.00
One-half of the difference between the
total valuation of the change order
extras, $333,952.55, and the F. H. A.
valuation, $178,672.00, said difference
being $155,280.55 ------------------------------------------ 77,640.27
$215,990.27
which sum added to the trial Court's judgment of
$147,905.00 makes a total judgment for Locke in the
amount of $363,895.27, together with interest at the rate
of 8% from the 31st day of December, 1954.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN M. SHERMAN,
Suite 212 California Bank Building,
15 North Oakland,
Pasadena, California
YOUNG, THATCHER & GLASSMAN,
By PAUL THATCHER,
First Security Bank Building,
Ogden, Utah
Counsel for Intervening Plaintiff and
respondent.
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MR. GOLDBERG, A. C. P. A., TESTIFIES AS TO
BOOKS AND RECORDS OF HARSH UTAH
CORPORATION AND HARSH INVESTMENT
CORPORATION AS FOLLOWS
(T. 549-551)
(T. 594)
BY MR. SHERMAN:

Q. Now, Mr. Goldberg, from your examination of
the books and records of Harsh Montana, Harsh Utah,
Harsh Construction, and Harsh Investment Company,
do you have an opinion as to whether or not thos'e books
were kept and maintained to accurately reflect the income and cost of the construction of the Harsh Montana
Great Falls Air Force Base housing project, and the
Hill Field Air Force Base project here in Utah in accordance with the generally accepted methods of accounting on construction jobs?
A. I'll say that they do not clearly and truly reflect
the true income and cost and expenses of the resp'ective
corporations in conformity with general accounting principles, and further I would say in conformity with the
revenue laws.

Q. Now, Mr. Goldberg, do you have an opinion from
your examination as to wheth'er or not any of those
corporations ever did at any time truly and accurately
so reflect upon their books and records the construction
income and construction cost?
A. At one time, at the beginning of the corporation,
Harsh Montana, the construction corporation, Harsh
Construction Company_! correct that, the books and
records were kept in accordance with standard accounting principles to reflect the income and expenses, the
income monthly. By that I mean each month according
to the progress of the contract and the progress of the
job, the amount earn'ed according to the pay estimate
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from the contractor or the owner and as approved hy
the FHA on their pay estimate was reflected to sho~
the amount due, the amount retained, and the income
'earned for the period. This was done for several months
and then discontinued, and at the end of the first period
I would say at the end of the second fiscal period, I
don't think the books wer'e closed in my opinion the first
year until Mr. Ellis came in, in 1952 after the clos'e of
the first fiscal year, and there was an over-lapping of
two fiscal periods, reversals were made journal entries
were made reversing out some of this income, and throwing a profit of one period into a substantial loss by correcting journal entries. I did not examine the tax
returns; that was not my purpose, but it was seen in
examining the general books and records.
Q. Do you have any notes that would establish the
amount of profit eliminated on this journal entry and
when the journal entry was madeY

A. I have a memorandum I think this referred to
'53. I'm not certain. I think the records will show, if
they have them her e. Journal entry '53; 10, 15, the
surplus, the original surplus account was credited and
a loss was substituted.
I think for the amount of
$210,142.54. There were several journal entries made
to effect this, and the explanation was that it was done
on the advice of tax counsel. I did not investigate this
any further. It was not my purpose or my jurisdiction,
and I just made a comment on it.
1

Q. Now, Mr. Goldberg, insofar as the books and
records of Harsh Investment Company were concerned,
w'ere they at any time set up even at the beginning to
truly and accurately reflect the income and disbursements of that particular construction company?
A. I would say the income was not reflected correctly.
2
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Q. It was not reflected in accordance with the
generally accepted methods of accounting1
A. That's correct.
(T. 594)
BY MR. SHERMAN:

Q. Now, Mr. Goldberg, is it as Mr. King has attempted to suggest to you that the proceeds received
from Irving Trust in any way, shape or form from an
accounting procedure, legal procedure, or any other way,
income1
A. It's definitely not income. It's a liability.
a mortgage payable. It's definitely not income.

It's

Q. And it's exactly in the same category in this accounting and this procedure as a mortgage that I might
carry on my house.
·
GLLE.Y-2
A. Exactly.
Q. And there is no difference.
A. That's true.

3
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ON CROSS EXAMINATION MR. WALTER
HUTCIDNSON, ONE OF THE ATTORNEYS FOR
APPELLANTS, TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS PERTAINING TO THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
PROJECT COST AND CONSTRUCTION COST
( T. 339-342)
CROSS EOCAMINATION
BY MR. SHERMAN:
Q. Now, there is a difference, isn't there, Mr. Hutchinson, between project cost and construction cost 1

A. Yes.
Q. And what different items are taken into consideration when you are considering only construction
costs~
In other words, what items do you eliminate
from the cost of the project to determine the construction cost?
A. Well, her'e the construction costs are all lumped
together.

Q. Well now -.
A. (Interposing) The Wherry project here.
Q. Well, now, Mr. Hutchinson, you testified the
project costs were so much, and these were, all these
items were included in the cost of the project. You mean
by that, I take it, that the project sitting up there cost
so much money irresp'ective of who was to pay for it,
whether it was to be the owner or contractor, isn't that
correct~

A. Thats right.
Q. And isn't it a fact that contract costs do not include FHA examination and inspection fees-that's not
a part of construction cost as such, is it~
4
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A. Well, it wouldn't be on the construction contract.

Q. It would not be in any circumstance.
be an owner's obligation, isn't that tru'e~

It would

A. Yes, that's true.

Q. All right. And the same is true of loan fees,
that's an owner's obligation and not a contractor's obligation or cost, isn't that true 1
A. That's true.

Q. And legal fees, title fees, in connection with the
mortgage is likewise a responsibility of the owner and
not the contractor, isn't that true 1
A. Yes.

Q. And architect's fees are an expense to the owner
and not to the contractor, isn't that true 1
A. That's right.

Q. And interest on the mortgage advances is also
an obligation of the own'er and not the contract, isn't
that true~
A. Well, that is not always true, no. It just depends
on how the contract is set up. In many instances, now,
there is a setup under FHA here where they don't get
insurance or advances until completion, where the contractor is to carry himself during construction on this
type job.

Q. On this project, where there is progression payments made during the entire period of construction
from the Irving Trust Company to the mortgagor, the
interest on th'e mortgage advances is an obligation of
the mortgagor corporation, isn't that true1
A. That's true.
5
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Q. And the FHA mortgage insurance is also an
obligation of the mortgagor and not of the contractor.
Is that not true 1

A. Yes.
Q. And all of those items that I have just enumerated are items on th'e books and records of Harsh Utah
Corporation as an obligation of the Harsh Utah Corporation and were paid by Harsh Utah Corporation and
not by Harsh Investment Company. Is that correct Y
A. That's correct.

Q. Now, there is no rule or regulation, is there, Mr.
Hutchinson, insofar as the Federal Housing Administration is concern'ed requiring a construction contract
to be entered into between the owner and the contractor
at any particular figure whatsoever?
A. There are rules this way, that if-.

Q. (Interposing) The only differences, Mr. Hutchinson-.
MR. KING:
(Interposing) Let him answer your question.

Q. If the figure is not satisfactory, in this instance
two million nine hundred ninety-five thousand dollarsA. (Interposing) Yes.
Q. - if it's any lower than that-.
A. (Interposing) Yes.
Q. - then th'e mortgagor puts up the difference
between that and the FHA cost of replacement, isn't
that true, in additional cash 7
A. If the contract had been any more, then this
6
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sponsor would have been required to put up mor'e
money-.
Q. (Interposing) Then there is no FHA requirement that sets the figure.

A. No.
Q. It's just the difference in the amount of cash put
up by the sponsor.
A. That's correct.
Q. In other words, if there had been a variation in
the contract price, the only difference would have been
is that Harsh Utah Corporation or Mr. Schnitzer would
have taken more money out of Harsh Montana or Pacific
Coast Equipment Company or borrowed more money
from his father-in-law and made the difference up in
cash. Isnt that true~
A. That is true.
Q. I have no further questions.
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MR. ELLIS, THE COMPTROLLER FOR HARSH
COMPANIES, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS CONCERNING FUNDS AVAILABLE! TO BUILD PROJECT AND STATUS OF MORTGAGE
(T. 1085-1087)

BY MR. SHERMAN:
Q. Then the figure I am talking about, Mr. Ellis,
would be $3,409,971.81, would it not'

A. I believe so.
Q. Which would reflect all of the funds available
through Irving Trust Company in any form at all for
the total building of the project both in so far as expenses of Harsh Utah Corporation, the owner, and
Harsh Investment, the contractor, are conc'erned. Isn't
that true~

A. That would reflect the total funds from all
sources.
THE COURT: $3,409,971.81.
Q. Now, Mr. Ellis, you do not represent to this
court, do you, that the original mortgage, as you have it
here on exhibit 246 from an accounting standpoint is
an income item, do you?

A. No, sir; I do not.
Q. And you h'eard Mr. Goldberg testify that a mortgage, from an accounting standpoint is strictly a liability. Is that not true~

A. That's correct, secured lien.
Q. And in order to reflect the true amount of income you would have to take the true overall picture.
Isn't that true?
8
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A. What do you mean by "tru·e overall picture?"

Q. Let's pin it down specifically, Mr. Ellis. In order
to truly reflect-if you were to do so as an accountant
on accounting principles, the income in the present case
to Harsh Investment Corporation, you would not be
concerned necessarily with mortgage money. Isn't that
correcU
A. That's correct.

Q. And you would be concerned with the amount of
the contract upon which a construction company contracted to build a project, isn't that true 1
A. That's true.

Q. Without concern of where the money was coming
from?
A. Right.

Q. And without concern as to what exp'enses the
owner on his own account was obligated to defray over
and above the construction contract itself. Isn't that
true?
A. That's correct.
Q. And the true amount of money as is testified to
by Mr. Goldberg that the construction company is entitled to from th'e owner company is the amount of the
construction contract plus the extras as set forth in the
specifications covering the job. Isn't that correct?
A. As to the extras, I can't say.
I don't know
whether the interpretation of those changes the contract
automatically or not. I do know they ar'e entitled to
the amount of the contract.
Q. Have you taken that into consideration at all,
Mr. Ellis, as to what the specifications provide on that
particular subject 1
9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A. It's hard to say. I have never read that.
Q. And its covered by article 15, changes in work
of the specifications. Isn't that tru'e?

MR. KING: Well, I object to this as not the best
evidence. This witness said he has never read them
and doesn't claim in any way to be able to interpret them.
THE COURT: The objection is overruled.

Q. You have not set up your books and records in
so far as Harsh Investment Company's income is concerned, taken into consideration the amount of the contract or the amount that the contractor may be entitled
to from the owner pursuant to the terms and conditions
of article 15 of the specifications, have you?
A. I have no such a thing as a contract receivable
account at all.

Q. And items you have put in here, I believe you
testified before from this witness stand are the items
you were directed to on your books and records by Mr.
Schnitzer.
A. As to income.

Q. Yes.
A. As income. I show the funds advanced over
from Utah to Investment in sales advance account and
close off the individual item.

Q. But you do not reflect and you have not s'et up
on the books of Harsh Investment Company the total
amount of the funds that they are entitled to in relationship to the contract and in relationship to the change_
orders under the sp'ecifications and particularly Article
15 of the specifications. Isn't that correct??
A. There is no such contract receivable account set
up.

10
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

MR. W ARICK TESTIFIES RE
ESCROW FUNDS AS FOLLOWS
(T. 1117-1121)

BY MR. SHER.MAN:
Q. And what is the total amount of the cash required for carrying charges and financing 1
A. The total cash for carrying charges and financing is $185,727.00. The total cash requirement for
construction fees carrying charges and financing is
$3,222,242.00. From that figure the amount of mortgage
funds available are substracted leaving a difference of
$585,442.00 which amount is deposited by the mortgagor
to show that there are sufficient funds on hand to complete the project.

Q. Now, what is the FHA requirements in so far as
that particular fund is concerned 1
A. You mean in disbursing funds¥

Q. Isn't it a fact, Mr. Warwick, that that particular
amount of money is deposited by th'e owner, the mortgagor say in this case, with the Irving Trust Company 1
A. Yes, sir.

Q. And that money is to be used along with the
proceeds of the mortgage to defray the total cost of the
Hill Field Air Force Base proj'ect. Is that correct 1
A. Yes, sir. That money is expended prior. That
money is disbursed by the mortgagee, Irving Trust in
this case, prior to the disbursement of any mortgage
funds.

Q. And is it not a fact, Mr. Warwick, that those
funds are disburs'ed in accordance with the requisition
of funds when the project is started¥
11
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A. Those are disbursed upon submission of, as we
call it, the title of the form, an application for insurance
for mortgage proceeds.

Q. And that is initiated by the contractor1
A. Yes, sir.

Q. And I believe for purposes of identification that
we have it as exhibit 141 the application for insurance
advances of mortgage proceeds which is the method
established, is it not, Mr. Warwick, for procuring these
funds from month to month as the project progresses,
from the bank, the Irving Trust Company for the payment of the sub-contractors, the contractor and the
materialmen.
A. It's the method of securing, of the mortgagor
securing funds from the mortgagee to pay for work
completed on the proj'ect and materials stored on site
as determined by the contractor's requisitions and inventories submitted being reconciled with the FHA inspector's report assigned to the project.

Q. And that happ'ens each month periodically during
the time that the project is being constructed. Is that
correct~

A. Normally it's once a month.

Q. And by policy the first money that is used or
disbursed by Irving Trust Company toward the payment
of these requisitions for material and work performed
on th'e site, first monies that are used are these, this
fund of $585,442.00 that you have been testifying about.
Is that correct~
A. That's correct.

That is disbursed first.

Q. And those monies must be according to the rules
and regulations of the Federal Housing Administration,
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and the policy of Irving Trust Company, be completely
exhausted and spent to satisfy these requisitions prior
to the time that any proceeds from the mortgage itself
are expended. Is that right~
A. The escrow deposit must be entirely used before
any of th'e mortgage funds are advanced.

Q. And then as additional requisitions come in from
month to month the progress payments are made until
the entire project is completed.
A. Yes, sir.

Q.

Is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And it's the policy, is it not, that certain reserves
are withheld pending the final completion of the project itself~
Yes, sir.
Q. And what is that particular amount percentagewise?
A. Ten percent of tile amount shown on the contractor's requisition as approved by FHA.

Q. Now, assuming the following facts, Mr. Warwick:
If the owner corporation entered into a contract with a
construction company, contracting corporation, to build
the Hill Field Air Force Base project in accordance with
the terms and conditions of the lump sum contract for
$2,995,205.00, and assuming that tile mortgage is in the
amount as you have testified to here, of $2,636,800.00,
and that the escrow is in the amount of $585,442.00; and
assuming further that this escrow was established, I
believe in July, July 21 of 1952 and in November of
1952 $300,000.00 was returned to the sponsor, in February an additional $220,000.00 was returned to the
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sponsor, and in March an additional $104,000.00 was
returned to the sponsor, making a total withdrawn out
of funds from Irving Trust Company Bank to the sponsor individually, Harold J. Schnitzer, of $624,000.00,
would there be sufficient funds left out of the total cash
required for the compl'etion of the project, with which
to pay the contractors and with which to pay the
amounts that were necessary for the completion of the
project~

MR. KING: Now, just a minute, Your Honor. That
question is not including the facts which are in this case.
It's incomplete on a numb'er of facts which have a material bearing on the answer to the question. I specifically have reference to the fact that both the contracting
corporation and the owner management corporation are
owned by the same person.
THE COURT: This man understands that.
MR. KING: That wasn't included in the question,
Your Honor. It doesn't appear on this record. If this
is going to be a hypothetical question, it has to include
all the facts that ar'e material here. It can't just include part of them.
THE COURT : That will be cross examination. I
think the question includes the facts which are testified
to.
MR. KING: There is an additional fact that is not
'included in it, and it is a mis-statement which is that
Harold J. Schnitzer is the sponsor of this project. That
is not th'e fact. The sponsor of this project is Harsh
Investment Corporation.

Q. Well, let's say that the money then in that respect
was not returned to the sponsor but $624,000.00 was returned to Harold J. Schnitzer individually.

14
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THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection. He may
answer.
A. Based on our computation of what it would cost
to complete this project, no there would not be sufficient
funds.

Q. Based upon the amount of the contract between
the owner and contractor which provides for payment
to the contractor of $2,995,205.00, ther'e would not be
sufficient funds to make that payment. Is that correcU
A. That's correct.
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MR. WALTER HUTCHINSON ON CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. SHERMAN TESTIFIEn AS
TO PAYMENT OF THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT-"LUMP SUM" AND CHANGE ORDERS
AS FOLLOWS (T. 829-833)

Q. The construction contract calls for a payment
from the owner to the contractor of $2,995,205.00,
doesn't itY
A. I'll have to assume your figure is correct. I
don't know. I haven't looked.

Q. Let's not assum'e anything.
A. All right.

Q. I'm showing you what has been introduced here
in evidence as exhibit number 61. That contract provides that the owner pay the contractor the sum of
$2,995,205.00, doesn't it Y
A. Yes.
Q. That is the amount of money that is supposed
to be paid, isn't it Y
A. That's right.

Q. And in addition to that, any approved extras
contracted with between the owner and the contractor
that are approved for a change of the plans and specifications or a change to article 15 of the sp·ecifications
are in addition to that figure, aren't they~
A. Yes.
Q. Now, the purpose, as required by FHA and Irving Trust Company, of that escrow deposit is to assure
FHA and Irving Trust Company that the owners will
have enough funds on deposit with which to meet the requirements to complete the entire project. Isn't that
correctY
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A. That together with the mortgage loan proceeds.

Q. That together with the $2,636,000.00-som'e dollars were to be used collectively to build the project out
here at Hill Field, weren't they~
A. That's right.

Q. And the reason for that money heing required
to be deposited in escrow is to assure that the sub-contractors and materialmen and the general contractor
would have sufficient funds available to build the project. Isn't that true 1
A. That's corr'ect.

Q. Now, how and in what manner, Hr. Hutchinson,
could anybody connected with the building of the Hill
Field Air Force base project determine in November of
1952 whether or not $300,000.00 could be plucked out of
Harsh Utah Corporation and still pay all the sub-contractors, the general contractors, and the materialmen~
A. Why, I think very easily.
corporation undoubtedly show it.

The books of the

Q. And it's your opinion that that is true1
A. That is my opinion that's true, yes.

Q. Is it your opinion that Harsh Utah Corporation
could still pay Harsh Investment Corporation, the general contractor, $2,995,205.00 plus extras and still drag
out $624,000.00 of that escrow~
A. Yes.

Q. As a matter of fact, it's practically impossible,
is it not.
A. L'et's take it a step at a time. I know that at the
time that withdrawal was made there was funds left
together with the approved extras to pay all persons
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having claims for labor and material.
Q. Including Harsh Investment Company, J\Ir. Hutchinson.

A. That's correct.
Q. That is your opinion 1

A. Yes.
Q. Are you talking about up to November of 1952,
or up to what date, Mrl Hutchinson 1

A. L'et's see, the project was closed in June or July;
July I think. July first.

Q. The project began.
A. I think so.

Q. Began, and the mortgage was closed in the office of FHA on the 21st day of July 1952, and the
mortgage was recorded on the 23rd day of July 1952,
and in November of the same year $300,000.00 was withdrawn.
A. Yes.

Q. In February of the following year $220,000.00.
A. Let's go to that November withdrawal and think
about that first. You see Mr. Schnitzer had already
advanced for and on behalf of the corporation the sum
of $25,000.00 for plans, $41,000.00 for plans.
Q. Now, Mr. Hutchinson, let me interrupt you for
just a moment.

A. Yes.

Q. All of that came back out of the $121,000.00
first, the very same day?
A. That's right part of it.
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Q. That's the day the mortgage was signed.
$121,000.00 changed hands that day.

The

A. Not $121,000.00; not anywheres n'ear.

Q. You were there, were you

not~

A. I was.

Q. And it's your testimony that ther'e was not the
sum of $121,000.00 and if the FHA reflected that sum,
that that would be correct~
A. It would be.

Q. If their records show that there were disbursements paid back to Mr. Schnitzer that day totalling
$121,000.00 broken down, I beli'eve, into different categories, but the total was that --.
A. (Interposing) I would have to take a look at
the figures and see.

Q. For plans and architect fees that were paid up
to that point or would have to be paid immediately,
that's tru'e, isn't it~
A. Yes.
MR. KING:

You misunderstood, Mr. Hutchinson. He said plans.
That is a different matter than architect fees.

Q. Is there any difference in the charge for architect fees for one s'et of plans and another set of plans~
Architect fees are so much.
A. There were, in addition to that $25,000.00, deposit made with the Air Force by Mr. Schnitzer personally.
Q. For off-site improvem'ent bonds.
A. No, for the privilege of getting the bid award
here.
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Q. Which was returned to him later on, wasn't itT

A. I don't know whether that was handled through
this or what.
'Q. The procedure is that it all comes back to him.

A. That's right, and that is when it was coming
back to him.
Q. So if by drawing out this $624,000.00 there wasn't
enough money left to pay Harsh Investment Company
$2,99·5,205.00 to pay the material men - $2,995,205.00
plus extras - to pay the sub-contractors, then it would
be up to Harold J. Schnitzer to dig down in his pocket
to pay it, wouldn't it~

A. He has given a personal guarantee to do it.
Q. He has given a personal guarantee to do that?

A. Yes.

Q. You didn't make a corporate resolution authorizing him to pull out the $300,000.00, did you, in November of 1952~
A. No.
Q. You didn't do it in February of 1953 for $220,000.00, did you¥

A. No.

Q. You didn't do it in March for $104,000.00, did
you?
A. No.
Q. You waited until June 10, 1954 at nine o'clock
in the morning to do it in Dwight King's office, didn't
you~

A. No. We did it on April first 1953. The matter
of $624,000.00
20
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Q. But never prepar'ed in written form, for tax
purposes or any other purpose, to submit to anybody
in connection with an income tax return withdrawal or
anything else, it was never reduced to anything more
than rough notes, if those~
A. That's right.
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MR. W. HAROLD WARWICK, CHIEF MORTGAGE
CREDIT EXAMINER FOR F.H.A., TESTIFIED
REGARDING CONSTRUCTION CONTRAC1
- "LUMP SUM" AS FOLLOWS
(T. 1115-1116) (T. 1164)
1
-

BY MR. SHERMAN:
Q. Now, Mr. Warwick, does the F'ederal Housing
Administration in any way concern itself with the amount
that the owner corporation contracts with a contracting
corporation for the building of a particular projecU

A. Only in so far as it is within a reasonable figure,
within reason.
Q. Does the Federal Housing Administration in
any way dictate what that particular figure has to beY

A. No, sir.
Q. What has b'een introduced as a photostatic copy
of the lump sum contract, which is exhibit one, which
I believe you have copies of there, Mr. Warwick, directing your attention to that document and the figure provided in there under the contract sum of $2,995,205.00,
now pertaining to that particular figure, does the Federal Housing Administration in any way dictate to either
the owner or the contractor the amount of that particular
figure!

A. No, sir.
(T. 1164)

MR. SHERMAN:
One of the other things that has to be certified to
is that the lump sum contract has been paid. Isn't that
truef
A. I believe that's correct. That is a question for
our legal counsel. I don't know.
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MR. HUTCHINSON TESTIFIES PERTAINING TO
CHARGE ORDERS AS FOLLOWS (T. 347-350)
BY MR. SHERMAN:

Q. Now, in regard to these change orders, Mr.
Hutchinson, the FHA as such is not inter'ested how much
the owner pays the contractor to make a change as long
as the change -- if it involves a change in the plans and
specifications, FHA approves it, isn't that correcU
A. Yes. The FHA is primarily concerned Q. (Interposing) Only to the point that if and when
there is an application by the owner to increase the
amount of the mortgage on that property, then FHA
assesses the amount for estimates at the same time for
the benefit of Irving Trust Company as to how much
the change, total change on the property could be safely
increased in the mortgage itself, and be insured by
FHA.
A. Again, they are just as concerned about a decrease, you see.
Q. Yes.
A. The legal effect of a change order is to change
the construction contract by that much.
Q. But there is nothing on this change order that
tells the mortgagor or the owner that he can only pay the
contractor so many dollars 1
A. No, there is nothing on that.

Q. And there is nothing on the change order, an
endorsement at any time from FHA that in any way
deals with financial amount of the change order itself
as between the owner and contractor. Is ther'e?
A. No, there is no change. It doesn't affect them.
It's just to determine whether the FHA will accept the
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propos'ed change at all and if so how much they will
increase the insurance on the mortgage.
Q. And the process of handling each individual
change order, is that they are handled in this manner
are they not~ They originate with the own·er, the mortgagor, and are prepared by the owner, are they not?

A. That's right.
Q. Then they are submitted to the contractor for
approval by the contractor, itn't that true~

A. Erither the contractor or the owner. They originate then to the lender and then to the FHA.
Q. Then they go directly to Irving Trust Company
in New York for endorsement by the Irving Trust Company in the place provided for by the signature of the
mortgagee, isn't that correct~

A. That's correct.

Q. Then they go to the Federal Housing Administrator's office, in this case in Salt Lake City, Utah, to
determine whether or not the particular requested
change is a beneficial change to the property, and the
plans and specifications can be changed accordingly,
isn't that correct?
A. That's correct.

Q. And at no time during that procedure is FHA
interested in any monetary transactions between the
owner and the contractor as to how much the owner is
going to pay the contractor for that particular change-.
A. (Interposing)

Well, -.

Q. - until such time when the owner requests an
increase in the mortgage, then it b'ecomes a factor, but
not until that time, isn't that true?
·24

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A. Only to this extent. They are concerned with
the mortgagor's ability. If the change orders indicate
that the mortgagor corporation is going to b'e obligated
to pay more than the construction contract, or increased
by more than ten percent, then the FHA becomes concerned on that, then they may have to increas'e the construction bond for performance on the construction of
the project.

Q. Then it becomes a bonding transaction.
A. That's right.

Q. It doesn't have anything to do with the amount
of money that is going to be paid to the owner of the
contract, does it~
A. No.

Q. The change order says on the face of it by
executing it whether it's an increase or decrease in the
mortgage, if it's an incr'ease whether the mortgage is
increased or not, the mortgagor agrees to pay for the
change, isn't that true~
A. That's right.

Q. No further questions.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. KING:
Q. I just have one question, Mr. Hutchinson. The
lump sum contract you have been talking about, as I
understand it, will n'ever be amended in amount. That
is a fixed amount.
A. That's right.
MR. SHERMAN:
But it's amended is it not, Mr. Hutchinson, by any
change order~
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A. That is entirely between the parties.

MR. SHERMAN:
The lump sum contract itself provides that the
contractor, at the time of the execution of that lump sum
contract, agrees with the owner to build that project in
accordance with the plans and specifications then in
existence, isn't that

true~

A. Thats the way it reads, yes.

MR. SHERMAN:
And if there is any change in the plans and specifications which are represented by these change orders,
then that is a change in the plans and specifications, and
a change in which the contractor is entitled to an increase
accordingly, is that not true~
A. It could be that way, yes.
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MR. WARWICK TESTIFIED PERTAINING TO
CHANGE ORDERS BETWEEN HARSH UTAH
CORPORATION AND HARSH INVESTMENT
CORPORATION AS FOLLOWS (T. 1123-1125)
BY MR. SHERMAN:

Q. Mr. Warwick, in regard to the change orders, is
the Federal Housing Administration concerned or interested as b'etween the owner and the contractor as to
the amount of these change orders, between the owner
and the contractor as such 1
A. Not in making our determination, only in so far
as reasonableness of the figur'es are concerned.

Q. And isn't it a fact that the FHA is not concerned
with transactions taking place between an owner and a
contractor to perform as to the amount required as to
perform a particular change¥
A. By that you mean what 1

Q. The FHA do'es not in any way dictate to the
owner what the owner can pay a contractor to perform
a particular change.
A. No.

Q. The FHA is required under this particular procedure, is it not, if it involves a change in the plans and
specifications from the architectural section to approve
that prior to the time the change can be made 1
A. Yes, sir.

Q. And then the subsequent assuming that it has
been approved, the subsequent negotiations between the
mortgagor and the FHA in so far as finances are concern'ed, is only for the purposes of determining, at the
final closing after the project has been complete, how
much if any increase will be granted by the FHA as

27
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

mortgage insurance.

Isn't that correct 1

A. It's assuming that the changes involve increas·es.
Q. Assuming that the changes have been approved
from an architectural standpoint, the plans and specifications have been changed accordingly and FHA has
approved those changes, and assuming that thos'e particular changes involve an expenditure of an additional sum
in some amount, then the negotiations between the
owner and FHA are for the purposes of determining
how much increase in mortgage insurance will be granted, isn't that correct~

A. How much, if any.
Q. If any. And that is not based upon the amount of
money that the owner may or may not have paid the
contractor for performing that particular change, FHA
do'es not dictate or control that particular figure, does
it?

A. No.
Q. In other words, isn't it a fact that the owner
comes in and says that he has these changes, that they
have been made, the changes themselves have be'en approved, representing to your organization that the owner
has paid the contractor, that the changes have cost the
owner so much money~
A. Well, these changes are approved or disapproved
by FHA on the assumption, yes, that there is either
some additional cost or some decrease in cost.

Q. And the negotiations are made for the increase
in the mortgage itself. Isn't that correct, and the insurance covering the mortgage~
A. That would be in order.

Q. But that figure that the mortgage may be in-
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creased in no way determines the amount of money that
the owner is to pay the contractor for a particular change
or group of changes, does it~
A. Unless that was the agre'ement between the
owner and the contractor, no.
Q. But in so far as any information in your files
are concerned, that does not appear to be the case. Is
that correct~
A. I do not believe we have any information on that
point.
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MR. ARTHUR W. ISAKSON, CONSTRUCTION
INSPECTOR FOR F. H. A. TESTIFIED REGARDING CHANGE ORDERS AS FOLLOWS (T. 279-280)
BY MR. SHERMAN:
Q. Y'es, Mr. Isakson. Now, from that document can
you ascertain what the total amount was of the change
orders requested by Harsh Utah Corporation and approved for work to be done or work done on the Hill
Field Air Force Base by the Federal Housing Administration with reference to the changes one through 79,
does that document that you have indicate what the total
amount of money was on approved change orders as
evaluated by Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh Investment Company7
A. The total that I have here is the amount as requested by the mortgagor on the change orders that
were approved subject, of course, to any omissions or
errors that were inadvertently made.

Q. Now, what is the total amount of those approved
change orders as requested by Harsh Utah Corporation Y
A. $279,126.00
Q. Now, that I understand, Mr. Isakson, is all of
t11e approved change orders to date, is that correct?
A. That is as it is today.
Q. Now, in addition to that, is there a change order
upon which Harsh Utah Corporation has requested reconsideration for approval Y
A. There is.
Q. And do you know what the number of that particular change order is!
A. Number 77.

30

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RE CHANGE, ORDER 77 MR. ISAKSON
TESTIFIED ON PAGES 435-436 AS FOLLOWS
BY MR. SHERMAN:

Q. All right. Mr. Isakson, that same change order
repr'esents to your office, does it not, that the Harsh
Construction Company represents that their cost and
expenditures to effect the change covered by this change
order, according to their computation and evaluation,
would b'e in the sum of $54,719.67. Isn't that correct~
A. There was a corrected figure here of $106.88.
This was the new total.

Q. Then the total put on there by Harsh Utah Corporation representing to your office that this change
order would cost $54,826.55 is the figur'e and is the representation made by that corporation to F. H. A. Isn't
that correct ¥
A. This is Mr. Schnitzer's figure, and this is mine,
the total.

Q. The total submitted though and represented by
Harsh Investment Company, I notice has-that is Harold
J. Schnitzer's initials.
A. Yes.

Q. Indicating that lie added to the figure of
$54,719.67 in his own handwriting the figure of $106.88
with the initials H. S. by it.
A. That's correct.

Q. And the word "total" is yours.
A. No.

Q. Who put the word "total" in there, if you remember~

A. I believe Mr. Schnitzer.
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Q. And the total of the two figures in red there of
$54,826.55 is yours.

A. That's correct.

32

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

MR. ELLIS TESTIFIES CONCERNING WITHDRAWAL OF FUNDS BY SCHNITZER
(T. 1094-1095)

BY MR. SHERMAN:
Q. Now, isn't it also true, Mr. Ellis, that if the
original escrow funds deposited pertaining to the Hill
Field Air Force Base project in the original instance at
the date of closing of th'e mortgage which I beleive that
we have had identified here as being approximately
$624,000.00. Isn't that correct?
A. I think that's correct.
Q. Now, $300,000.00 of those funds had been withdrawn in November 1952 by Mr. Schnitzer, and
$220,000.00 withdrawn in February of 1953 by Mr.
Schnitzer, and anotller $104,000.00 withdrawn in March
of 1953 by Mr. Schnitzer, which I believe you testified to,
and I beleive it's your testimony that totals $624,000.00
withdrawals in that period of time, that there would not
have been sufficient funds available to both Harsh Utah
Corporation and Harsh Investment Corporation to completely carry out the terms and conditions of the lump
sum contract whereby Harsh Utah Corporation could
pay to Harsh Investment Company the sum of
$2,995,205.00 and still be sufficient funds to pay the
items to be paid by Harsh Utah Corporation as set up
on your books.
A. I can't deny that.

Q. And then it would not have be'en necessary to
have gone through these Inter-company transfers here
that you speak of and that you have outlined on exhibit
number 247.
A. That's right.

Q. No further questions.
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HAROLD J. SCHNITZER TESTIFIED RE PAYMENT OF· CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT-"LUMP
SUM" AND FUNDS AVAILABLE TOO BUILD HILL
AIR FORCE BASE! HOUSING PROJECT AS
FOLLOWS (T. 989-992)
BY MR. SHERMAN:
Q. Is it your purpose, Mr. Schnitz'er, to convev to
this court that you were to have no funds of your 'own
in these projects and that you were only to spend FHA
mortgage insured funds to construction the projects?

MR. KING:
I object to it as calling for a conclusion and unintelligible and goes to the very qu'estion that Your
Honor had to decide.

THE COURT:
The objection is overruled.
A. I have never on this stand attempted to convey
that impression, Mr. Sherman. I have n'ever made any
statement to that effect.

Q. Isn't it a fact, Mr. Schnitzer, that you have repeatedly said that the only income and the only funds
available for the construction of the Hill Field Force
Bas'e project was the amount of the mortgage'
A. The mortgage was intended to be the funds with
which the project was to be built, yes.

Q. And you know that in addition to that bid the
FHA requirements were that you were required to put
additional mon'ey up of your own funds, isn't that trueT
A. That was always understood, escrow fund.

Q. The escrow fund, and for payment of certain
costs of the owner-management corporation totalling
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$585,000.00 on the Hill Field Air Force Base Project.
Isn't that true 1
A. In so far as FHA is conc'erned, those funds can
be used to pay off any obligation, yes.

Q. And they are to pay off the cost of the project
that the owner was to pay, according to your own witness' testimony, Mr. Hutchinson. Isn't that true 1
A. If the project cost exceeds the mortgage disburs'ements the escrow funds are supposed to be available for that purpose.

Q. And they are supposed to be available further
for the purpose of paying the lump sum contract entered
into with the contractor. Isn't that true 1
A. No.

That is not necessarily true.

Q. It's certainly tru'e according to FHA rules and
regulations. Isn't it, Mr. Schnitzer 1
A. I don't believe that the FHA regulations that I
have ever seen state that.

Q. Now, Mr. Schnitzer, you know what the lump sum
contract provides. It provides the owner manag'er pay
the contractor $2,995,205.00 doesn't it 1
A. That is the figure of the contract, yes.

Q. And prior to the time that figure was placed in
that contract in July of 1952, you had signed an identical,
except for the figure, lump sum contract in th'e State of
Montana, hadn't you 1
A. That's true.

Q. And you knew every provision in those contracts.
A. I have so testified when we signed the Montana
contract I became familiar with the lump sum contract.
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Q. And that was in March of 1951 that you signed
the Montana contract~

A. That's right.
Q. And you signed the one in Utah in July of 1952.

A. July 1952, correct.
Q. And you knew what the terms and conditions of
this contract was and the contract provided in the Utah
contract that the owner, Harsh Utah Corporation, would
pay to the contractor $2,995,205.00. Isn't that correct.

A. That's right.
Q. On the original plans and specifications.

A. That's right.

Q. In order to do that it would be necessary to have
the mortgage money you receive plus the additional
funds of the escrow, wouldn't it?
A. To do whatt

Q. To pay the contract of $2,995,205.00.
Not necessarily.
Q. How else could it be paid, Mr. Schnitzer'

A. Paid in tlle manner followed by many of these
sponsors.
Q. I'm asking you how on the Hill Field Air Force
Base project.
MR. KING:

If ~{r. Sherman will permit Mr. Schnitzer to answer
the question, he might get an answer. He can't get an
answer if he talks all the time.

Q. I'm asking you, Mr. Schnitz'er, how could the Hill
Field Air Force Base project sponsor, Harsh Utah Com-
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pany pay to Harsh Investment Company $2,995,205.00
without putting additional funds in over and above the
mortgage amount of money~
A. They can do it in the manner approved by the
FHA.

Q. And the FHA is not concerned with how it's
done, and t:lle only thing that you are required to do in
so far as that is concerned is to certify to the FHA at
the time it's closed finally and turned over to Fanny
Mae, that the contractor has been paid and that all the
sub-contractors and materialmen have been paid, isn't
that tru'e1
A. You are absolutely right.
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l\IR. ELLIS TESTIFIES RE WITHDRAWAL OF
FUNDS BY SCHNITZER AND PAYMENT OF
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT - "LUMP SUM"
(T. 424, 425)
BY MR. SHERMAN:
Q. And you are familiar with the fact, are you not,
Mr. Ellis, that the lump sum contract entered into on
the 21st day of July of 1952 between Harsh Investment
Corporation and Harsh Utah Corporation calls for the
payment of funds of Harsh Utah Corporation to Harsh
Investment Company of $2,995,205.00. Isn't that correct?

A. That I think is tile lump sum price.

Q. And it would be absolutely impossible for Harsh
Utah Corporation to carry out the terms and conditions
of that agreement with Harsh Investment Corporation
after having been paid out Mr. Harold J. Schnitzer the
sum of $624,000.00 between November of 1952 and March
24, of 1953, wouldn't it?
A. I don't b'elieve it would.

Q. How could it have been done by funds available
to Harsh Utah Corporation?
A. If you refer to cash, that is one thing.

Q. I am referring to cash. The contract doesn't
refer to it being paid in automobiles, does it?
A. The contract specifies tile amount of $4,995,000.00
Q. Of cash.

A. However, Harsh Investment Company hasn't
received $2,995,000.00.

Q. And when they receive all of the money, the ten
percent withheld in Irving Trust Companys hands, they
still will not have received $2,995,000.00, will they¥
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A. No.

Q. Because they have

paid in

the

meantime

$624,000.00 out to Mr. Harold J. Schnitzer, didn't

they~

A. That is not the reason they will not rec'eive that
amount of money. They will not receive $2,995,000.00.
Q. Because the mortgage is $2,600,000.00.
A. Yes.

Q. In other words, to make up the difference th'ere
would have to be additional funds available to Harsh
Utah Corporation. Isn't that true~
A. That's correct.

Q. And those additional funds were originally
placed in escrow, were they not~
A. I b'elieve they are.

Q. And then they were paid back out of the escrow
to Mr. Harold J. Schnitzer between November of 1952
to March 24, 1953, isn't that correct~
A. That's right.

Q. And they were not then available to make payment from the Harsh Utah Corporation to Harsh Investment Company, were they~
A. No.
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LOCKE RE CONSTRUCTION COSTS AND PROJECT COSTS DETERMINATION OF PROFIT
(T. 794, 795)
BY MR. KING:

Q. And then you also discussed with him the fact
that you might want to include rental income and add it
to the amount of the mortgage payment to bring up the
amount of money available to pay costs so that if thete
was a possibility of profit that would be taken into account.
·
A. Mr. King, I knew what that project cost was,
and I knew what the contract value was. I knew very
well there was profit.

Q. You knew all the costs too, did you not 1
A. Absolutely, I knew exactly what th'e costs were,
and I knew what the contract value was.

Q. That's all I want to know, Mr. Locke. Thank you
very much.
BY MR. SHERMAN:

Q. What was said on that particular occasion that
Mr. King has just referred to about rental income, if
anything.

A. We had spent fifty or sixty thousand dollars in
Montana overtime that he was charging on the construction company. I didn't fe'el it would be fair to penalize
the contractor for that expenditure, and that is when ~e
said the rental income would be calculated.

Q. Now, Mr. Locke, do you know approximately how
much money was spent in Utah on Hill Field Air Force
Base project on overtime alone~
40
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A. I would say close to 45 to 50 thousand dollars.

Q. Now, Mr. Locke, did your conferences in Washington pertain to the mortgage increases on the change
orders in any way have anything to do in regard to the
value of those sam'e change orders between Harsh
Montana Corporation the owner and Harsh Construction
the builder 1
A. Oh, absolutely not.

Q. What did they pertain to 1
A. A mortgage increase for the owner.

Q. That's all.
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1IR. GOLDBERG TESTIFIES IN RE MORTGAGE
PROCEEDS AND INCOME
(T. 571, 572)
MR. KING 2:
Q. That's why I want to get Mr. Goldberg and me
straightened out as to who got $2,995,000.00.

THE COURT:
Harsh Investment is yet to get it or has got it.
A. That's true.
Q. From Harsh Utah Corporation.

A. That's true.

Q. Now, Mr. Goldberg, then this sum of money
which the Irving Trust Company is to pay this amount
of $279,000.00, that isn't payable to Harsh Investment at
all, is it?
A. No.

Q. That's to Harsh Utah.
A. That's true.
Q. To [So n this figure $2,995,000.00 income to
Harsh Investment isn't in the same category.

A. Absolutely two differ'ent categories.
liability and the other income.

One is

Q. All right. Now, let's go along here; then as I
understand it we've got one thing straightened out when
you say gross income contract price we ar·e talking about
gross income to Harsh Investment Corporation.

A. That's true.
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J[R. GOLDBERG TESTIFIES IN RE THE CARD
GREAVES REPORT- EX. 182 (T. 591)
MR. KING 2:

Q. Is only that you have included in your report-.
A. (Interposing) Mr. King, I said his report does
not reflect the net profit or loss under the resp'ective
contracts. All there is in there are costs.

Q. That is as I understand it. And he didn't claim
to have an audit which showed the income.
A. Who didn't claim?

Q. Mr. Gr'eaves in this report.
A. No, Absolutely not. I testified to that.
Q. Now, he had an audit when you were up there,
did he not?

A. Mr. Greaves told me he had never seen the contract. He didn't know what the income to the construction company was. He didn't know what the change
orders are. He was instructed just to prepare a statement showing the cost of both corporations and that is
what he did.
Q. He had an audit to show you income figure
though, didn't he?
A. He did not.

Q. Didn't he show you that figure?
A. Absolutely not.
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